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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FEDERAL COURTS: IS THE
CONSTITUTION A SWORD?
BRUCE MILLER1*
In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed that “[t]he
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he [sic]
receives an injury.” This pronouncement has shaped a widespread
assumption that the rule of law under our Constitution entails a right
to seek a judicial remedy when constitutional rights are violated. But,
perhaps surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never squarely held that
such a right exists. And some recent decisions, most particularly
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, decided in December of 2021,
cast serious doubt on the truth of Marshall’s bold proposition.
This Article claims, in contrast to the Supreme Court’s recent
direction, that much of our law of constitutional remedies depends on
the premise that a person who is injured by a constitutional violation
has a right to sue for judicial relief for that injury. Specifically, the
injunctive relief exception to sovereign immunity established by Ex
parte Young, the Bivens damage remedy for (some) constitutional
violations by federal officers, the duty of state courts to remedy
constitutional violations by their own governments, and the
assumption that some court of competent jurisdiction must be
available to hear suits raising constitutional claims all rely, at least
tacitly, on the proposition that the Constitution is a sword.
Were the Supreme Court openly to acknowledge and endorse this
1*. Bruce Miller, Professor Emeritus, Western New England University School of Law.
I am grateful to the students in my Federal Courts and Jurisdiction classes in 2020–22 for the
rich discussions that led to this Article. Thanks also to Tori Thomas, Senior Articles Editor for
this volume of the Western New England Law Review, for soliciting and overseeing its
production, and to the staff of the Law Review, particularly Meaghan Collins and Sean Buxton,
for many helpful suggestions for improving it. Above all, I am deeply indebted to Melissa
Bailey, Western New England University School of Law, Class of 2022, for her tireless and
accurate research, endless patience and tenacity, and overall good cheer.
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proposition, the remedial regime available for constitutional
violations and, with it, the rule of the Constitution as our supreme law,
would inevitably become far more secure than they are today. On the
other hand, the current Court’s apparent indifference to Chief Justice
Marshall’s Marbury description of “the very essence of civil liberty”
undermines the coherence of this regime and thus threatens its
stability and vitality.

INTRODUCTION: MARBURY V. MADISON AS NARRATIVE
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison2 may be as
significant for the story it tells about the rule of law under the American
Constitution as it is for its foundational contribution to the institution of
judicial review. Every constitutional law student learns that in the second
part of that opinion, Marshall claims the inevitability of a special, and
final, role for the judicial branch in deciding constitutional meaning by
pointing to what courts do: “It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”3 That special and final
role justified the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Congress’s conferral of
original jurisdiction over William Marbury’s effort to secure a writ of
mandamus to Secretary of State James Madison, directing the delivery of
Marbury’s commission to serve as a Justice of the Peace for the District
of Columbia. Perhaps less emphasis in the education of American lawyers
is given to Marshall’s explanation, in the first part of his opinion, of why
Marbury was entitled, as a matter of law, to the mandamus to begin with:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection.
....
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation
of a vested legal right.
....
. . . [W]here a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that
the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to
the laws of his country for a remedy.
....
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Id. at 177.
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It is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed . . . that
the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus, is to be
determined.
....
. . . [W]here [the head of a department] is directed by law to do a
certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals . . . it is not
perceived on what ground the courts of the country are further excused
from the duty of giving judgment, that right be done to an injured
individual . . . .4

This account of the essential role of law and of courts in curbing the
abuse of official power in the name of protecting individual rights shapes
the understanding that most Americans share about how our legal system
is supposed to work. 5 And it is the audacity of the account, that the
operation of law, given force by the declaration of a judge, could constrain
the power of a cabinet officer carrying out a presidential policy, as much
as Marshall’s justification for constitutional judicial review, that explains
the dismay with which Marbury v. Madison was received by Secretary
Madison and President Jefferson.6 Marshall’s straightforward narrative—
that a person harmed by conduct that violates the law may count on the
courts to remedy that harm no matter how powerful the violator—anchors
our cherished convictions that no one is above the law,7 that Presidential
power “is not a blank check,”8 and that the commander in chief of the
Army is not the commander in chief of the country.9 It explains why a
foreign national held for two decades without trial, and abused in
American military custody at Guantanamo Bay Prison, could plausibly

4. Id. at 163–71.
5. See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1972); Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.
6. See Robert M. Casale, Revisiting One of the Law’s Great Fallacies: Marbury v.
Madison, 89 CONN. B.J. 62 (2015).
My construction of the Constitution is . . . that each department is truly
independent of the others and has an equal right to decide for itself what is the
meaning of the Constitution in the cases submitted to its action; and especially
where it is to act ultimately and without appeal.
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 277 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., libr. ed. 1903).
7 . See Dellinger, supra note 5; Marbury, 5. U.S. at 163; see also, e.g., Theodore
Roosevelt, Third Annual Message to Congress, 7 Dec. 1903, in THE YALE BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS 648 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (“No man is above the law and no man is below
it; nor do we ask any man’s permission when we require him to obey it.”).
8. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
9. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 643–44 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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still express conviction that his faith remains in the law.10
Still, a closer read of Marshall’s promise of judicial protection for the
unlawfully injured reveals it to be considerably more conditional,
nuanced, and complex than it first appears. The Marbury opinion’s great
paradox is, of course, that the judicial remedy so resoundingly guaranteed
in its first part is just as emphatically pulled back in the second, because
of Marshall’s conclusion that the Supreme Court could not
constitutionally accept jurisdiction over Marbury’s suit.11 So the most
obvious qualification to Marshall’s guarantee is that a litigant who seeks
to redeem it must proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Three more potential barriers to a litigant’s success lie just beneath
the surface of Marshall’s opinion. The first is that the court must
determine that the plaintiff was injured by the unlawful conduct she points
to.12 Marbury plainly was injured through the denial of his confirmed
appointment to a federal judgeship.13 But our voluminous and vigorously
contested law of standing to sue shows how formidable, if often subtle,
this obstacle can be.14 Second, although Chief Justice Marshall places
very high public officers and cabinet secretaries, certainly, and, in
principle, presidents as well, within the reach of judicial power, he
disclaims authority to decide the illegality of all official activity
undertaken by these high officers.15 This distinction between justiciable
and non-justiciable government action manifests itself today in the
political question and government and official immunity doctrines, all also
fraught with controversy and complexity.
The last prerequisite to a litigant’s successful request for judicial
10. See Carol Rosenberg, The Legacy of America’s Post-9/11 Turn to Torture, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/12/us/politics/torture-post-9-11.html
[https://perma.cc/KPF5-9VMX]. “I only have the law.” Id. (quoting Mohamedou Slahi).
11. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 138.
12. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984).
13. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 162.
14. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 738; Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–
09 (2013).
15. “The intimate political relation, subsisting between president of the United States and
the heads of departments, necessarily renders any legal investigation of the acts of one of those
high officers peculiarly irksome, as well as delicate . . . .” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 169. “By the
constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his
country in his political character, and to his own conscience.” Id. at 165–66.
[W]here the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the
executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be
more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where
a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers
himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
Id. at 166.
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relief is perhaps the most mysterious. Even if a plaintiff has plainly been
injured by allegedly unlawful conduct, has commenced suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and has named defendants whose unlawful actions
are within reach of judicial power, a court can only adjudicate her suit if
an appropriate source of law grants her a right to sue.16 In Marbury v.
Madison, the right to sue, historically often called a cause of action—or
since 1938, a claim for relief—was conferred by Congress’s authorization
of common law judicial writs of mandamus against public officers,
confirmed by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 17 Even if Marbury had, as
Marshall held, a right to his commission, and even if Secretary Madison
had a duty to deliver it, a court would not have the power to vindicate that
right or to enforce that duty in the absence of such a right to sue.18
This separation of the unlawfulness of a defendant’s conduct from the
right of an injured plaintiff to seek a judicial remedy for that unlawfulness,
can seem invisible. But it can also be crucial, especially in suits aimed at
enforcing obligations imposed by federal law. In state law proceedings
growing out of common law rights and duties, the illegality of a
defendant’s conduct is usually coterminous with the plaintiff’s right to
sue. What it means to violate a common law obligation is that one can be
sued by the victim of that violation.19
For rights and duties created by federal law, as well as those conferred
by state statutes, the situation is quite different. Whether a federal statute
authorizes judicially enforceable remedies at the behest of private parties
is up to Congress. New law students also learn that not every federal
statutory violation is redressable in court by someone injured by that
violation. 20 The test normally is whether Congress has conferred, by
specific statutory language, a private right to sue.21 Sometimes, of course,
though rarely in recent decades, federal courts have recognized that a
federal statute grants an implied private right to sue for its violation
16. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 839–41 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012); Marbury, 5 U.S. at 167–68, 170, 173–
80.
17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (adopting “claim for relief” over “cause of action”); FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (referencing motions to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted”).
18. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 74–76 (1975); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus. Regul., 496 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1990); Ward v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320,
331–32 (2015) (illustrating that an explicit right to sue is normally needed to get into court).
19. A common law cause of action is conventionally defined as “the fact or combination
of facts that gives a person the right to seek judicial redress or relief against another.” Cause
of Action, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 2008) (emphasis added).
20. See generally Smith v. Kansas City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (involving
a federal statute with no explicit right to sue); Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368
(2012) (same); Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916) (same).
21. Smith, 255 U.S. at 199; see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

456

6/13/22 10:07 AM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:451

notwithstanding the absence of explicit authorizing language.22 And some
statutory rights—though again with decreasing frequency in recent
years—have been held to be enforceable through the generic right of
action granted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of the
Constitution and laws of the United States committed by persons acting
under the color of state law. 23 Finally, federal statutory rights can be
enforced in state, and sometimes federal, courts when state law grants a
right to sue for violation of the standard they set.24
But the recognition of several paths toward judicial redress of federal
statutory violations via suits filed by injured plaintiffs does not suggest
that Marshall’s Marbury Part I maxim, that for every violation of law there
is a judicial remedy, applies to all interests protected by federal statutes.
Congress remains free to adopt methods of its own choosing to enforce its
statutes, such as criminal prosecutions, civil fines, or federal department
or agency enforcement, instead of or in addition to private claims for
judicial relief. Examples of federal statutory protections which rely
largely or completely on government rather than private litigation
enforcement include those provided by the Food and Drug Act,
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Clean Air Act, and Consumer
Product Safety Act.25
The rights conferred and obligation imposed by federal statutes do,
of course, carry the force of law through the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.26 At the same time, because these rights and duties were
brought into existence only through the exercise of the plenary, wholly
discretionary, political powers held by the Congress, we see their scope,
nature, and limits, including how they are to be enforced, as within
Congress’s ultimate control as well.27
Constitutional rights and duties have a very different pedigree. They
are part of our supreme law not because they were created by Congress or
the executive, or for that matter, the judicial branch, but because we the
people endowed them with that supremacy through our acts of

22. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1964); see also Cannon, 441
U.S. at 717 (1979); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001).
23. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 1 (1980); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).
24. See, e.g., Smith, 255 U.S. at 212–13 (involving a common law cause of action that
borrows a federal statute as a standard of disability).
25. See generally Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768
(codified as amended in various sections of 21 U.S.C.); Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–75, 677–78; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671; Consumer
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–58, 2060–61, 2063–90.
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
27. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015); Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
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constitutional ratification and amendment.28 In this sense, constitutional
rights are transcendent, for their obligatory character does not depend on
any person’s or institution’s subsequent exercise of political power or
discretion. The transcendent legal status of constitutional rights has
practical implications for our understanding of their place in Marshall’s
Marbury account of the powers and duties of courts to guarantee remedies
for unlawfully inflicted injuries. If the Constitution is supreme law, and
if it confers rights, the holders of these rights must enjoy a right to sue
when they are violated, and both the federal and state courts are
correspondingly obliged to grant an appropriate remedy. That, at any rate,
is what Marshall must have meant in Marbury, Part I.
“Must have meant” is, though, a necessary hedge to this claim. For
even if Americans broadly assume that our aspirational legacy of
government under the rule of law entails a right, guaranteed by the
Constitution’s supremacy, to seek judicial remedies for its violation,
Marbury alone does not provide a secure foundation for such a right. His
compelling narrative notwithstanding, Marshall’s conclusion that
Marbury was entitled to his writ of mandamus, and thus to his judgeship,
was not, as many commentators have pointed out, a “holding” arrived at
by the Marbury opinion.29 Because it was withdrawn by the failure of
Supreme Court jurisdiction, the mandamus order was never granted,
leaving its legal force at least somewhat diminished.
More importantly, Marbury’s right to sue for his writ, because it was
granted by Congress’s adoption of the common law, in no way stands for
a right of judicial access drawn from the Constitution itself. And finally,
it is very likely that Marbury’s suit did not seek to enforce a constitutional
right at all. Though the matter is not entirely clear, Part I of Marshall’s
opinion asserts that Marbury’s right to become a federal judge derived
from “acts of congress [sic] and the general principles of law.”30 Marbury,
then, was not itself a suit that directly tested whether the Constitution
confers a right to sue for its violation. At most, Marshall’s Part I opinion
tells a convincing story about how such a suit ought to fare, or perhaps,
how we wish it might fare.
Our subsequent constitutional history, perhaps surprisingly, has not
satisfactorily resolved the question. The Marbury story still resonates,
28. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 377 (1819)
(“[T]he constitution acts directly on the people, by means of powers communicated directly
from the people. . . . It springs from the people, precisely as the state constitution springs from
the people, and acts on them in a similar manner.”); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 780 (1995).
29. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803); see also, e.g.,
Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John Marshall’s Judicial
Statesmanship, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 422 (2004); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1969).
30. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170.
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probably often unconsciously, in our popular legal imagination. And, in
the aftermath of the Civil War, an unprecedented burst of reformist energy
from Congress yielded a federal statutory right to sue for redress of
constitutional violations resulting from state and local laws, policies, and
actions. That right, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, lay largely moribund for
nearly a century. But since 1960, § 1983 has been interpreted to authorize
a comprehensive array of legal and equitable remedies for
unconstitutionally inflicted injuries committed by state and local officers
and by city and county governments.31
Section 1983 does not, however, authorize suits which either are
directly against the states or seek damage remedies payable from state
treasuries. 32 Nor is there any federal statutory parallel to § 1983
authorizing analogously comprehensive relief against unconstitutional
federal policies or actions.33 Relief for constitutional violations by the
states and by federal officers is nonetheless sometimes granted by the state
and federal courts, respectively.34 But the basis for their authority to do
this is surprisingly uncertain, and therefore worryingly unstable. The
Supreme Court has never squarely held that the Constitution itself grants
a right to sue for its own violation.35 And seven years ago, albeit in a case
involving only statutory rights, the Court appeared to suggest that in the
absence of an authorizing statute, access to a judicial remedy for a
violation of any source of federal law, including the Constitution, was not
a plaintiff’s right, but instead was entirely a matter of judicial discretion.
In that case, Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, the Court
unanimously held that the Supremacy Clause does not authorize a claim
for relief for violations of federal law.36 Although the case exclusively
concerned federal statutory violations, the holding, and its unanimity,
appear to be unqualified, thus perhaps extending to infringements of

31. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 186 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 623 (1980); Hafer
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28 (1991); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979).
32. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67–68 (1989).
33. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 427–30 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
34. See id.; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,
21–22 (1980); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus.
Regul., 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109–10 (1994).
35. Bivens, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Reich come close to granting a
right to sue from the Constitution itself, though. Bivens holds that a person whose Fourth
Amendment rights are violated is entitled to redress his injury through a remedy “normally
available in the federal courts.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. Young obligates states to provide a
right to challenge state officer action in federal court seeking an injunction. Young, 209 U.S. at
168. Reich holds that withdrawing a right to sue is unconstitutional. Reich, 513 U.S. at 106–
07.
36. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326–27 (2015).
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constitutional rights as well.37
Last December, the Supreme Court appeared to reaffirm the view it
expressed in Armstrong, this time extending its application to claims
seeking remedies for constitutional violations. In Whole Woman’s Health
v. Jackson, the Court denied emergency injunctive relief against state
judicial officers from entertaining private suits authorized by a Texas
statute against providers of abortion services in direct contravention of
Roe v. Wade.38
The aim of this Article is to suggest that the perspective on
constitutional remedies expressed in Armstrong and underscored in
Jackson underestimates the role Marshall’s Marbury Part I narrative has
played in the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights. The Article
will not contend that Marbury’s implicit endorsement of a self-enforcing
Constitution, however embedded it might be in our legal consciousness,
is necessarily required by the most accurate reading of our history and
law. It will claim, however, that several doctrinal pillars of our current
constitutional practice appear to depend on an assumption that a person
who is injured by a constitutional violation has a right to sue for judicial
relief for that injury. Foremost among these are the officer injunctive
relief exception to governmental sovereign immunity rooted in Ex parte
Young and the Bivens damage remedy for some constitutional violations
by federal officials. 39 This same assumption also helps to explain the
long-recognized obligation of state courts to remedy constitutional
violations by their own governments, even, perhaps especially, when the
governments are immune from federal court accountability, and the deep
reluctance of the Supreme Court to sustain restraints on judicial
jurisdiction that would prevent the enforcement of constitutional rights.40
If these features of our regime of constitutional adjudication do rely
on the proposition that the Constitution entails a right to an adequate
remedy for its violation, then the Supreme Court’s apparent conclusion to
the contrary in Armstrong and Jackson may threaten their vitality by
undermining their coherence. On the other hand, recognition that some
venerable premises of our constitutional practice depend on the basic truth
of Marshall’s Marbury story would both bolster the foundation of these
practices and enhance their usefulness in protecting constitutional rights.
The remainder of this Article will proceed by first reviewing the
Supreme Court’s 2015 Armstrong decision rejecting the Supremacy
Clause as a source of a right to sue and its 2021 decision in Jackson
denying injunctive relief against a state law in open violation of the
37. See id.
38. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021); see also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), as modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
39. See Young, 209 U.S. at 159; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–96; Reich, 513 U.S. at 109–10.
40. See McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 39.
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Constitution. This review will be followed by an offer of the evidence
that the doctrinal pillars mentioned above—Young, Bivens, the state court
duty to remedy state constitutional violations, and the presumption against
legislative withdrawals of constitutional jurisdiction—depend on the
contrary assumption that the Constitution does entail a right to sue for its
violation. Finally, this Article will conclude by suggesting some ways in
which recognition of this dependence might fortify judicial vindication of
constitutional rights. If judges are more confident in a conviction that
Marshall’s Marbury story is essentially correct, the rule of law under our
Constitution will similarly become more secure.
I. ARMSTRONG’S AND JACKSON’S UNDERSTANDING OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES AS ROOTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE
COMMON LAW
A. Armstrong’s Rejection of the Supremacy Clause as a Source of a
Right to Sue
Armstrong was a suit by service providers under the Medicaid
program to enjoin Idaho State Officials to reimburse them at rates
authorized by the federal Medicaid statute. 41 The Medicaid program
provides federal funds to the states to provide health care to indigent
people.42 In order to secure Medicaid funds, states must agree to spend
them in accordance with conditions imposed by federal law. 43 The
question raised by the Idaho providers’ suit was whether any source of
federal law authorized a federal court to adjudicate their claim for
injunctive relief.44
The rights the providers sought to enforce in Armstrong were, as
Marbury’s likely were as well, wholly statutory, and thus within
Congress’s plenary remedial control.45 Armstrong thus did not, at least
not directly, address a right to sue for constitutional violations at all.
Nevertheless, both the plurality and dissenting opinions adopted a view of
the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause that casts significant doubt on
whether the current Supreme Court would recognize such a right.46
The legal standards governing the Medicaid program are enforceable
through two avenues besides private suits for injunctive relief. First,
whenever the federal department that administers the program, in this case
the Department of Health and Human Services, adopts regulations to carry
it out, affected parties may seek judicial review of these regulations under
41. Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 322–24.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
43. Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 323.
44. Id. at 322.
45. Id. at 323.
46. Id. at 327–29; id. at 338–39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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the Administrative Procedure Act. 47 Second, whenever a state fails to
follow relevant federal requirements, such as the rate standards at issue in
Armstrong, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to
withhold the state’s Medicaid funding.48
In addition, as noted in the Introduction to this Article, violations of
federal statutory rights by state actors can be actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.49 The Supreme Court has held that some requirements imposed
on states under the federal Social Security Act are enforceable through
§ 1983. 50 But none of these holdings are at all recent, and their
applications have been significantly limited by subsequent decisions.51
No Justice in Armstrong suggested that the case could have proceeded
under § 1983.
The Armstrong plurality opinion by Justice Scalia held that the Idaho
providers’ suit was not authorized by the Medicaid statute itself, either.52
Obviously, the statute included no right to sue provision available to the
providers. And its indirect conferral of rights on Medicaid providers (the
Medicaid statute’s requirements take the form of directives to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services53) precluded a finding that the
statute granted them an implied right to sue. Finally, Congress’s
designation of the fund withholding remedy as the only way for the
Secretary to enforce the “judgment-laden” reimbursement rate standard
showed that Congress wanted to make that agency remedy exclusive.54
The four dissenters, spoken for by Justice Sotomayor, disagreed only
on the plurality’s final point. Justice Sotomayor argued that the fund
withholding regime did not displace what she identified as the traditional
equitable authority of the federal courts to restrain state official actions
which conflict with the substantive requirements of federal law.55
The Armstrong service providers did not rely only on the Medicaid
statute as a source of authority for their right to sue. They argued further
that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution grants anyone harmed by a
violation of federal statutory law by a state government officer a right to
seek injunctive relief for that violation.56 There is no doubt that the “and
47. Id. at 323–24 (plurality opinion).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
49. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420–22 (1970); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, 10–11 (1980).
51. Recent decisions have rejected using this avenue, though. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002); City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119–
21 (2005).
52. Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 328.
53. Id. at 331.
54. Id. at 336 (Breyer, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 336–37 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 324 (plurality opinion).
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the laws” portion of the Supremacy Clause applies with equal force to
both statutory and constitutional rights. But if the rights conferred by
federal statutes are created by, and thus within the plenary control of,
Congress, it is hard to see how this argument could help the providers’
position. To recognize Medicaid rights, and the remedies by which these
rights are to be enforced, as the supreme law of the land, is to endow
everything Congress has enacted in the Medicaid statute, including the
statute’s limitations, with that supremacy. The remedies available for
statutory violations under the Supremacy Clause are just those provided
for, either expressly or impliedly, by federal statute. This Article argues
that the Constitution’s supremacy as law has properly been understood
differently when remedies for constitutional violations are at stake. But if
the Medicaid statute did not authorize the Armstrong providers’ suit, the
supremacy of federal statutory law only underscores that failure. The
providers’ contrary contention would mean that, at least in the absence of
Congressional prohibition, every standard established by federal law
effectively presumes a right to sue for injunctive relief against its
violation.
Both the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia and Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent apparently read the providers’ Supremacy Clause argument as
authorizing only efforts to enjoin state actions that are inconsistent with
federal statutory law.57 But neither opinion explains why a presumption
that authorizes injunctive relief in these statutory preemption actions
would not also apply to suits seeking similar relief against federal or
private defendants who fail to comply with federal statutory requirements.
Such a presumption is at odds both with the principles of “arising under”
jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and with seemingly settled
limits on the availability of implied private rights of action to enforce
federal statutes.
The Armstrong Justices, plurality and dissenters alike, rejected the
providers’ Supremacy Clause argument. But rather than declare that the
supremacy of federal law reinforces the exclusivity of statutory remedies
for statutory violations, all the Justices appeared instead to agree that the
Supremacy Clause operates only as a “rule of decision” and never confers
a right to sue.58 This understanding may in turn imply that federal court
remedies, even for constitutional violations, may similarly be limited to
those fashioned or authorized by Congress. Per Justice Scalia’s plurality
opinion:
It is apparent that this clause creates a rule of decision: Courts “shall”
regard the “Constitution,” and all laws “made in Pursuance thereof,”
as “the supreme Law of the Land”. . . . It is equally apparent that the
Supremacy Clause is not the “source of any federal rights,” and
57. Id. at 340 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 326 (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 324 (plurality opinion); id. at 339 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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certainly does not create a cause of action. It . . . is silent regarding
who may enforce federal laws in court, and in what circumstances they
may do so.59

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent appeared to accept this characterization
of the Supremacy Clause, albeit grudgingly perhaps, and not without
nuance. She concurred that “the Court is correct that it is somewhat
misleading to speak of ‘an implied right of action contained in the
Supremacy Clause.’”60 But in the same breath, she added that “that does
not mean that parties may not enforce the Supremacy Clause by bringing
suit to enjoin preempted state action.”61 With respect to unconstitutional
state action, Justice Sotomayor was even more emphatic: “That parties
may call upon the federal courts to enjoin unconstitutional government
action is not subject to serious dispute. . . . [W]e have characterized ‘the
availability of prospective relief of [this] sort’ . . . as giving ‘life to the
Supremacy Clause.’”62
But like the plurality, and Justice Breyer in concurrence, Justice
Sotomayor ultimately explained the Court’s history of enjoining illegal
government action as an exercise of discretionary equitable power,
derived from our common law history and subject to complete
displacement by Congress.63 Her disagreement with the plurality rested
only on her conclusion that the enforcement scheme established by
Congress for the Medicaid program did not displace this equitable
power.64
Justice Scalia made only a passing reference to Young, the
foundational Supreme Court decision recognizing the power—and,
perhaps, the duty—of federal courts to enjoin unconstitutional
government action, notwithstanding the immunities enjoyed by the
government entities and officers carrying out that action. 65 And that
reference made no mention of the fact that Young protected constitutional,
as opposed to merely statutory, rights. 66 Justice Breyer’s concurrence
relied entirely on previous cases involving statutory rights with no
mention of Young at all.67 It is, perhaps ironically, Justice Sotomayor’s
unsuccessful effort to apply Young that places the Supremacy Clause’s
authorization of a right to sue for constitutional violations in the most
jeopardy. Her emphasis on the proposition that the federal courts are
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 324–25 (citation omitted).
Id. at 339 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 337–39 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
Id. at 342; id. at 346 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 346 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 326–27 (plurality opinion); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Id. at 340 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 333–36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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empowered to enjoin unconstitutional governmental action relied squarely
on Young as the “most famous exposition of this principle.”68 She then
accused the Armstrong majority of “threaten[ing] the vitality of our Ex
parte Young jurisprudence.”69 But by conceding that the same majority
had correctly identified the roots of Young as deriving from the common
law rather than the Constitution, she acceded, perhaps inadvertently, to
Congress’s ultimate plenary control over the judicial remedies available
even for violations of constitutional rights, and thus to the ultimately
contingent character of these remedies.
B. Jackson’s Rejection of a Constitutional Right to an Adequate
Remedy for a Constitutional Violation
The contingency of constitutional remedies implied by Armstrong
became explicit in the Supreme Court’s December 2021 decision in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Jackson.70 Jackson involved Texas’s now notorious
statutory scheme aimed at evading the requirements of the Court’s
decision protecting women’s constitutional right to seek abortion services.
The Texas statute prohibited physicians from performing or inducing an
abortion if they detected a fetal heartbeat. This prohibition was in direct
contravention of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution to
protect prevention abortion rights in Roe v. Wade,71 Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,72 and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstadt.73 Texas opted to
enforce this abridgment of women’s constitutional rights by authorizing
private individuals to bring civil actions for injunctive relief, substantial
statutory damage awards, and attorney’s fees against abortion providers.
The Texas statute permitted providers to raise their constitutional rights
only in defense to these civil actions.74
In response to a federal court suit by Texas abortion providers against
a Texas state court judge and court clerk, as representatives of similarly
situated classes of defendants, the Supreme Court, by a 5–4 vote, affirmed
the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of a district court judge’s award of preliminary
injunctive relief against any action to enforce the statute. 75 Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court held that the injunction was barred by the
sovereign immunity of the states from federal court suits, even those

68. Id. at 337 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 341.
70. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
71. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as modified by by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
72. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
73. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582 (2016). 74.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.209(f) (West 2021).
75. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 532; see also, Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 13 F.4th 434
(5th Cir. 2021).
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seeking to enforce constitutional rights. 76 Justice Gorsuch saw the
providers’ suit as falling outside Ex parte Young’s authorization of federal
court injunctive relief against state officers’ enforcement of
unconstitutional state policies because the enjoined Texas defendants
were judicial rather than executive officers.77 For Justice Gorsuch, Young
recognized only “a narrow exception” to sovereign immunity, grounded
in “traditional equity practice. 78 So limited, Young did “not normally
permit federal courts to issue injunctions against state-court judges or
clerks.” 79 Under Young, Justice Gorsuch claimed, such an injunction
“would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.”80
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion omitted Young’s approval of federal court
injunctions against state court proceedings
brought to enforce an alleged unconstitutional state statute, after the
unconstitutionality thereof has become the subject of inquiry in a suit
pending in a Federal court which has first obtained jurisdiction
thereover . . . . [U]nder such circumstances, the federal court has the
right in both civil and criminal cases to hold and maintain such
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.81

Nor did he mention the Supreme Court’s subsequent application of this
principle to justify federal injunctive relief against state judicial officers
in order to protect constitutional rights.82
More fundamentally, though, Justice Gorsuch’s identification of
Young as having only common law rather than constitutional roots
allowed him to avoid addressing the question whether the injunction at
issue in Jackson was necessary to protect the plaintiffs from
unconstitutional injury. Had the Jackson majority considered itself
obligated to address this question, it would have been hard pressed to
ignore the practical impact of the Texas enforcement scheme on Texas
women’s constitutional rights.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent emphasized the chilling purpose and
impact of Texas’s enforcement design on abortion providers’ ability to
provide constitutionally protected services. 83 Contrary to her apparent
view in Armstrong, Justice Sotomayor also now saw the relief required by
Young to derive from the Constitution itself, not just the common law’s
76. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 532 (2021).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 531.
79. Id. at 532.
80. Id. (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908)).
81. Young, 209 U.S. at 125.
82. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 228–29 (1972); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522,
523 (1984).
83. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 545 (2021) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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equitable tradition:
Like the stockholders in Young, abortion providers face
calamitous liability from a facially unconstitutional law. To be clear,
the threat is not just the possibility of money judgments; it is also that,
win or lose, providers may be forced to defend themselves against
countless suits, all across the State, without any prospect of recovery
for their losses or expenses. Here, as in Young, the “practical effect of
[these] coercive penalties for noncompliance” is “to foreclose all
access to the courts,” “a constitutionally intolerable choice.”84

Chief Justice Roberts also dissented in part. His opinion emphasized
that “court clerks who issue citations and docket [such] cases are
unavoidably enlisted in the scheme to enforce [Texas’s] unconstitutional
provisions.” 85 Like Justice Sotomayor, Roberts pointed to Young’s
constitutional roots, quoting its condemnation of state authorization of
“harass[ment] . . . with a multiplicity of suits or litigation generally in an
endeavor to enforce penalties under an unconstitutional enactment.”86
Chief Justice Roberts also recognized the role of Marbury v. Madison
itself in shaping our understanding of the obligation of the judicial branch
to enforce the Constitution: After observing that “[t]he clear purpose and
actual effect of [Texas’s law] has been to nullify this Court’s rulings,”87
the Chief Justice channeled Chief Justice Marshall’s venerable
justification for judicial review: “It is, however, a basic principle that the
Constitution is the ‘fundamental and paramount law of the nation,’ and
‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.’”88
C. The Inadequacy of the Common Law Explanation for Constitutional
Remedies
The Armstrong Court was no doubt correct in seeing the power of
courts to enjoin unlawful executive action as “exceedingly well
established”89 by “a long history of judicial review.”90 But, as the recent
Jackson decision shows, to rely exclusively on common law history as the
basis for the judicial power to remedy unconstitutional government
conduct does not adequately explain or justify this power. First, such
reliance is in some tension with our now well-established post-Erie
tradition of limited federal court authority to fashion federal common law.
84. Id. at 547–48 (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 218 (1994)).
85. Id. at 544 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. Id. (quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 160).
87. Id. at 545 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
88. Id. (alteration in original).
89 . Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 337 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id. at 327 (plurality opinion).

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

6/13/22 10:07 AM

IS THE CONSTITUTION A SWORD?

467

To be sure, the Supreme Court has recognized such a power in the face of
congressional silence when important federal interests are at stake.91 On
the other hand, some of the Justices have recently expressed skepticism
about the federal courts’ authority in the absence of a statute to “assume[]
common-law powers to create causes of action” because of “the mere
existence of a . . . constitutional prohibition.”92
More importantly, there is ample evidence in our history of an
assumption by the Supreme Court that the Constitution itself, most
likely—though probably not solely—through the Supremacy Clause,
confers a right to sue for its own violation. The Court’s establishment of
several doctrines protecting access to constitutional remedies appears to
depend on such an assumption. The first of these is the “Ex parte Young
jurisprudence” to which Justice Sotomayor referred in her Armstrong
dissent,93 at issue in both Armstrong and Jackson, to which this Article
now turns.
II.THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF THE EX PARTE YOUNG REMEDY
The Supreme Court’s landmark 1908 decision in Ex parte Young94
defies easy explanation. There is no doubt that the key proposition for
which it is taken to stand, the power of federal courts to enjoin the
enforcement of unconstitutional state policies—notwithstanding the
apparently contrary prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment—is crucial
to the practical enforcement of constitutional rights.95 At the same time,
it is hard to know what to make of a foundational case that appears to rest
on a legal fiction, to be a product of a now discredited First Gilded Age
view of the Constitution, to depend on an internally contradictory
understanding of what counts as state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and to be easily explicable, in contemporary terms, on
grounds far less dramatic than its pathbreaking significance would
suggest.
On the merits, Young is a substantive due process relic of the
Lochner 96 era. A powerful railroad challenged a populist state statute
limiting the rates it could charge as an unconstitutional restraint on its
economic liberty.97 The railroad’s claim was credible only because of the
Supreme Court’s late nineteenth-century transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment from a guarantor of the legal and political equality of African
91. Id. at 331.
92. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 341 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
94. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
95. Id. The Supreme Court allowed for suits in federal courts for injunctions against an
official acting on behalf of a state to proceed despite the State’s sovereign immunity when the
State officer acts contrary to federal law or to the Constitution. Id. at 142–45.
96. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
97. Young, 209 U.S. at 127–28.
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Americans to a protector of corporate economic power. 98 The liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment had come to be defined through
the laws of the Social Darwinist economic doctrines called for by, as
Justice Holmes aptly put it, “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”99
The sole obstacle to the railroad’s success in a Supreme Court in thrall
to laissez-faire was that it sought to use the Constitution as a sword to
enjoin implementation of the rate statute, rather than just as a shield to
protect it against criminal prosecution or other state enforcement
measures. This offensive deployment of constitutional liberty rights
seemed to be barred by the 1890 decision in Hans v. Louisiana.100 In
Hans, the Court had read the Eleventh Amendment to preclude the federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over any suits, including those
claiming violations of constitutional rights, seeking relief against the
states.101
The Supreme Court’s solution was the famous “Young fiction”:
although the railroad’s challenge, as in Hans, sought a judicial remedy for
injuries caused by an alleged unconstitutional state policy, the Court held
that it was not really a suit against the state in violation of the teaching of
Hans.102 Justice Peckham’s opinion reasoned that if the rate statute really
was unconstitutional, any state officer charged with enforcing it thereby
forfeited their official authority to do so.103 This fiction led to the strange
conclusion that even though the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
unconstitutional actions only if they are engaged in by the states,104 the
railroad’s suit to enforce that prohibition sought to enjoin a state officer
as if he were a private party, and thus did not seek relief against the state
itself. However mind-numbing it may sound a century later, Peckham’s
dodge elegantly solved the railroad’s Eleventh Amendment problem. Its
suit to enjoin unconstitutional state action as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment was no longer a suit against the state for purposes of the ban
on adjudicating such suits imposed by the Eleventh Amendment.
Beyond this murky pedigree, Young’s foundational stature in the law
of constitutional remedies has been diminished at least somewhat by the
emergence of a convincing alternative explanation for its outcome.
Beginning with Monroe v. Pape in 1960, Supreme Court interpretations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have revolutionized our understanding of the
remedies Congress has provided for unconstitutional injuries caused by

98. See generally Larry Yackle, Young Again, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 51 (2013); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988).
99. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
100. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
101. Id. at 16–17.
102. Young, 209 U.S. at 159–60.
103. Id. at 157–60.
104. Id. at 159–60.
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state policies and actors.105 Under this revised understanding, the railroad
plaintiff in Young could, without resort to any legal fictions, sue the
enforcing state officer in either federal or state court for either damages or
injunctive relief under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.106 Such a suit
would be one against a “person who, under color of any statute . . . of any
State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights . . . secured by the Constitution.”107 Seen retroactively, through
the lens provided by this contemporary reading of § 1983, Young’s force
might be fairly easily blunted, at least by anyone inclined to do so.108 If
the Young remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations was in fact
authorized by a federal statute available to the Court when the case was
decided, perhaps the case should now be read as nothing more than an
example of that authority.
Despite its arguably unsavory origins, and the alternative § 1983
justification for its outcome, Young continues to carry iconic status in our
law of constitutional remedies.109 The question is why. The plurality
opinion in Armstrong suggests that the origins of Young lie purely in the
English common law tradition of discretionary equitable remedies against
public officers, which became part of the received heritage of the
American legal system. 110 If this is true, the Young remedy, like all
common law doctrines, abides only as long as it is not altered or
withdrawn by Congress. 111 This is apparently the teaching of the
unanimous Armstrong court, and insofar as its applies to remedies for
violations of statutory rights, it seems unassailable. But Young matters
because of the route it opened to the enforcement of constitutional rights.
105. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), partially overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved:
Beyond the “Unhappy History” Theory of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 BYU L. REV. 737
(1991).
106. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 159–60 (authorizing § 1983 suits against state and local
government officers even if conduct was unauthorized by state law); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 31 (1991) (holding that state officers may be held liable for damages under § 1983 for
actions taken in their official capacities); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71,
n.10 (1989) (confirming that state officers sued for injunctive relief in their official capacity are
considered persons under § 1983).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
108. It must be acknowledged that the late twentieth-century Supreme Court’s revival of
§ 1983 was significantly influenced by an understanding of the liability of states and state
officers to restraint by federal law that was powerfully shaped by Young. See Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332 (1979); Will, 491 U.S. 58; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Hafer, 502 U.S. 21.
109. See generally Ex Parte Young Symposium: A Centennial Recognition, 40 U. TOL. L.
REV. 819 (2009); David L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 69 (2011); John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008).
110. Armstrong, 575 U.S. 320 at 326.
111. Id. at 324–25.
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And the Young opinion appears to reflect an understanding that these
rights create judicial obligations beyond the exercise of traditional
equitable discretion.
To be sure, the Young opinion repeatedly acknowledged that the
injunction at issue was issued against a state officer by a “[f]ederal court
of equity,” and that the question before it was whether such a court of
equity had jurisdiction in the case. 112 Nevertheless, the opinion’s
emphasis from the outset was on the injury to the railroad’s constitutional
rights, inflicted both by the rate statute and, just as important, by the
methods chosen by the state to enforce it.
The opinion opened by presenting the dilemma the statute forced on
the railroad by calling for prosecution of any of its employees who might
violate it.113 The only method authorized by the state to challenge the
statute’s constitutionality was for the railroad to direct its employees to
flout the rate limit and run the risk of imprisonment.114 Completely aside
from the constitutionality of the rate statute itself, this Sword of Damocles
method of enforcement had “the necessary effect” of “preclud[ing] a
resort to the courts . . . for the purpose of testing its validity.” 115 This
preclusion of an unfettered path to a judicial remedy for a possible
constitutional violation was itself “unconstitutional on [its] face.”116 The
similarity to the enforcement scheme authorized by Texas, and sustained
by the Court in Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson,117 could hardly be
more striking.
The Young opinion’s opening focus on the unconstitutionality of the
state’s enforcement scheme is significant in two respects. First, it suggests
that the states are obliged by the Constitution itself to provide adequate
remedies for their own potential constitutional violations, including,
where necessary, a right to sue in their own courts. Second, it is the
absence of a constitutionally adequate state law remedial scheme that
justifies the intervention of a federal court to protect the due process rights
of an injured plaintiff.
When the Young opinion turned to the authority of a federal court to
hear the railroad’s challenge to the rate regulation itself, it is again the
constitutional character of the challenge that warrants setting aside the
Eleventh Amendment prohibition of suits against states:
[We] must give to the [Eleventh] Amendment all the effect it naturally
would have, without cutting it down or rendering its meaning any

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149 (1908).
Id. at 126–27.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 148.
See discussion supra Section I.B.
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more narrow than the language, fairly interpreted, would warrant. . . .
. . . [W]e have ample justification for the assertion that individuals
who, as officers of the state, are clothed with some duty in regard to
the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are
about to commence proceedings . . . to enforce against parties
affect[ing] an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution,
may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.118

So, while the suit sought equitable relief against a state officer, it was
the alleged unconstitutionality of the state statute the officer was charged
to enforce that overcame the constitutional defense the Eleventh
Amendment would otherwise have afforded.
Finally, the opinion pointed to the uncontested availability of federal
habeas corpus relief against unconstitutional state imprisonment. 119
Although the “[p]rivilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus”120 is protected
against abridgment by the Constitution, the right to sue for habeas relief
in federal court was established, as the opinion acknowledged, by federal
statute.121 If the habeas analogy is helpful to the Young opinion’s assertion
of authority to enjoin the rate statute, an authority which at the time could
claim no statutory support, the reason is that both remedies are deployed
to enforce constitutional rights.122 As the opinion made clear, they each
derive from the “supreme authority [of the United States], which arises
from the specific provisions of the Constitution itself.”123
The constitutional roots of the right to sue in Young are confirmed by
its later elaboration, and limitation, in Edelman v. Jordan. 124 The
Edelman litigation sought to expand Young’s authorization of injunctive
relief to encompass claims for damages payable from state treasuries as
well, effectively overruling Hans. 125 The federal rights at stake in
Edelman were purely statutory, conferred by since-repealed provisions of
the 1935 Social Security Act.126 These provisions offered federal support,
conditioned on compliance with federally mandated conditions, to state
programs of financial assistance to impoverished, aged, blind, and
disabled people. 127 The Court had previously determined that suits to
enforce conditions imposed on states by their acceptance of federal funds
under this program were included within the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 right of
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Young, 209 U.S. at 150–56.
Id. at 167–68.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Young, 209 U.S. at 167–68.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 167.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Id. at 663–64.
Id. at 653–54.
Id.
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action against state officers for violations of the laws of the United
States. 128 The question presented by Edelman was whether the state
sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh Amendment precluded
damage awards against state officers for violating the Social Security Act,
if the damages were ultimately paid by the states themselves.129
By a five to four margin, the Court held that the Young remedy was
limited to claims seeking injunctive relief, and that the Eleventh
Amendment continued to bar damage remedies against state
governments. 130 Explaining this distinction, the Edelman majority
described the rationale for the claim for relief in Young in purely
constitutional terms:
Ex parte Young was a watershed case in which this Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment did not bar an action in the federal courts
seeking to enjoin the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a
statute claimed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. This holding has permitted the Civil War
Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than
merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect.131

To serve dependably as a sword, the Constitution must have the
capacity to be unsheathed, regardless of whether a statute or the common
law authorizes the sword to be drawn. Hence, the Edelman majority
opinion included no reference to the historical availability of equitable
remedies against public officials, or to § 1983 as the legitimizing source
of judicial remedies for constitutional violations. The only limitation to
the force of the constitutional sword confirmed by Edelman is the textual
demand to preserve the meaning of a competing constitutional value, the
principle of state sovereignty recognized by the Eleventh Amendment. As
a matter of constitutional realpolitik, once it is clear that the protection of
constitutional rights is assured by a claim for injunctive relief for their
violation, an extension of that claim to permit a damage remedy against
states as well “would appear . . . to fall afoul of the Eleventh Amendment
if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any
present force.”132
The Constitution as our supreme law thus plays a major explanatory
role in the Supreme Court’s balancing of the enforceability of
constitutional rights against the immunity from federal court suits enjoyed
by the states. To be sure, it remains possible, at least technically, to
identify the right to sue for relief from a constitutional violation authorized

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 674–75; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 426 (1970).
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663–64.
Id. at 651–52.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 664–65 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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by Young and confirmed by Edelman as deriving from the common law
or a federal statute—§ 1983. But it is much harder to explain the rationale
for these foundational cases in a way that does not depend on the existence
of a right, granted by the Constitution itself, to seek judicial relief for its
violation.
III. THE RISE, AND NEARLY COMPLETE DEMISE, OF BIVENS
DAMAGE CLAIMS BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION
If the injunctive relief claim authorized by Young may, despite its
constitutional rationale, find roots in the equity traditions of common law,
the damage remedy for constitutional violations by federal officers
inaugurated by the landmark Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents133 case
does not. Before the Supreme Court decided Bivens in 1971, it had
authorized claims for injunctive relief against the unconstitutional actions
of federal officers, albeit with sparse explanation. 134 Long before the
Young remedy was limited in Edelman, the Court had also held this
authorization inapplicable to officer suits seeking to recover money or
property from the federal government in the absence of an act of
Congress.135 Dissenting from one of these holdings, Justice Frankfurter
pointedly rued the dubious legal status of the federal government’s
sovereign immunity:136
[A] steady change of opinion has gradually undermined unquestioned
acceptance of the sovereign’s freedom from ordinary legal
responsibility. . . . In varying degrees, at different times,
the . . . historic doctrine is . . . deflected by an unexpressed feeling
that governmental immunity runs counter to prevailing notions of
reason and justice.137

Notwithstanding Justice Frankfurter’s doubts, the Supreme Court has
uniformly seen the Constitution’s conferral on Congress of exclusive
power over federal expenditures as precluding damage awards payable
from the federal treasury without federal statutory authorization. 138
Rooted in the separation of national governmental power, this immunity
affords the federal government a constitutionally based defense—even to
constitutional claims—that is analogous to, and most likely even stronger
than, the protection of the states from federal court suits recognized by the
Eleventh Amendment.

133.
(1971).
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
Id. at 686–89.
Id. at 709 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 708–09.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (defining Congress’s spending powers).
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In seeking a damage remedy against the federal narcotics officers—
as opposed to the government itself—who had searched his home and
arrested him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Bivens also faced the
possibility that judicial power to award monetary relief against these
officers would be dependent on a right to claim such relief granted either
by a federal statute or by state law.139 Hence, the position of the Justice
Department charged with defending the officers who victimized Bivens
was that his remedy lay in a state law tort claim against the officers, which
could then be removed to a federal district court.140 If their actions were
indeed unconstitutional, the officers’ pre-emption defense against the state
lawsuit would fail and Bivens could accordingly be made whole.141
In a similar vein, Justice Black, dissenting in Bivens, argued that suits
against federal officers, even for constitutional violations, can proceed
only when authorized by federal or state statute:
[T]he point of this case and the fatal weakness in the Court’s judgment
is that neither Congress nor the State of New York has enacted
legislation creating . . . a right of action. For us to do so is, in my
judgment, an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give
us.142

Justice Black’s argument evidently rested on the proposition that
Congress’s presumed plenary control over federal court jurisdiction
entails the (lesser included) power to determine the sources of law from
which judicial relief could be claimed. 143 In support of this position,
Justice Black pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
There can be no doubt that Congress could create a federal cause of
action for damages for an unreasonable search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Although Congress has created such a federal
cause of action against state officials acting under color of state law,
it has never created such a cause of action against federal officials. If
it wanted to do so, Congress could, of course, create a remedy against
federal officials who violate the Fourth Amendment in the
performance of their duties.144

In its pathbreaking holding in Bivens, the Court rejected Justice
Black’s contention that only Congress may authorize suits to remedy

139. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971).
140. Id. at 390.
141. Id. at 392–94.
142. Id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting).
143. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850). See generally Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685–86 (1946).
144. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 427–28 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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constitutional violations.145 But why? If Young and its application to
claims for injunctive relief against federal officers were grounded solely
in the common law equitable tradition, it would be of no use to Bivens
since that tradition did not extend to the provision of damage remedies
against public officials.146 A more promising lesson from Young, for the
purpose of supporting a more generalized authority for constitutional
remedies, might be drawn from Justice Peckham’s holding that a state’s
failure to provide unfettered access to judicial relief from an
unconstitutional policy was a separate and independent constitutional
violation from the one caused by the policy itself.147 If the states, under
full governance by the Constitution only since the post-Civil War
Amendments, were obligated to assure access to judicial review of the
constitutionality of their laws and policies, surely so was the national
government, whose sovereignty had been both authorized and limited by
the original Constitution since 1787, and further constrained by the Bill of
Rights since 1791.
Both Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Bivens and Justice
Harlan’s concurrence indeed did rely on the constitutional sources of
Young. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the court began by citing Bell v.
Hood for the proposition that “where federally protected rights have been
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”148 Brennan did
not here directly suggest any particular solicitude for constitutionally
protected rights, and, like the passage he quoted from Bell, he was
biblically vague about the origins of the power he sought to defend.
“From the beginning” neither needs nor can claim any more ultimate
source of support.
Brennan’s opinion then offered the unhelpful observation, again from
Bell, that “it is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been invaded,
and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done.”149 Obviously, as Justice Black pointed out, the problem facing the
Bivens Court was that, beyond 28 U.S.C. § 1331, authorizing federal
district court jurisdiction over cases “arising under” federal law, which
does not itself confer a right to sue, 150 Bivens could point to no such
145. Id. at 396–97 (majority opinion).
146. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1988); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 190 (2d ed. 1988).
147. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 146–48 (1908); see also supra notes 112–23 and
accompanying text.
148. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 684).
149. Id. at 396 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 684).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Smith v. Kansas City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214–
15 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Macon Grocery Co. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 215 U.S. 501,
506–07 (1910); Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 570 (1912).
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statute. Still, Bell was itself a case that drew no authority from a claimauthorizing statute. In Bell, the Court held that the federal district courts
could exercise § 1331 jurisdiction over claims for damages against federal
officers for violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but did not
decide whether the Constitution alone could authorize relief for such
claims.151 The Court’s opinion, perhaps ironically in light of his position
in Bivens, was by Justice Black.152 It was premised largely on the Court’s
“established practice . . . to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to
issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to
restrain individual state officers from doing what the [Fourteenth]
Amendment forbids the state to do.” 153 If this “established practice”
justifies damage awards against these officers as well, it is obviously not
because of something unique or exclusive about jurisdiction to award
equitable relief. The justification lies instead in the more general power
to protect legal rights, including in both Bell and Bivens, “rights
safeguarded by the Constitution.”154
Justice Brennan eventually focused specifically on the constitutional
character of Bivens’ claim. After pointing out that state law can neither
authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth Amendment nor limit the
exercise of federal authority, 155 he emphasized that, lawfully, “[t]he
inevitable consequence of this dual limitation on state power is that the
federal question [whether Bivens’ Fourth Amendment rights were
violated] becomes . . . an independent claim both necessary and sufficient
to make out the plaintiff’s cause of action.”156
After next examining the relationship between the respective roles of
the federal courts and Congress in fashioning remedies for constitutional
violations,157 Justice Brennan held that Bivens had indeed made out such
a separate and independent claim. 158 His opinion then concluded by
appropriately pointing to Marshall’s Marbury narrative: “The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”159
For Justice Brennan, it is the status of the Constitution as supreme law,
paired with the general judicial power to remedy violations of that law,
that does the work in Bivens. The equitable relief authorized by Young is
simply one example of this general power, as opposed to the historically
unique and limited exception portrayed in Armstrong and Jackson.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Bell, 327 U.S. at 684.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 684 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 397.
Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
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Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Bivens was, if anything, more
explicit than Justice Brennan’s about the constitutional basis for the right
to sue established by the decision. Justice Harlan opened with the
following eloquent statement of the question:
I turn first to the contention that the constitutional power of federal
courts to accord Bivens damages for his claim depends on the passage
of a statute creating a “federal cause of action.” Although the point is
not entirely free of ambiguity, I do not understand either the
Government or my dissenting Brothers to maintain that Bivens’
contention that he is entitled to be free from the type of official
conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment depends on a decision
by the State in which he resides to accord him a remedy. Such a
position would be incompatible with the presumed availability of
federal equitable relief, if a proper showing can be made in terms of
the ordinary principles governing equitable remedies. However broad
a federal court’s discretion concerning equitable remedies, it is
absolutely clear—at least after Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, that in a
nondiversity suit a federal court’s power to grant even equitable relief
depends on the presence of a substantive right derived from federal
law. Thus the interest which Bivens claims—to be free from official
conduct in contravention of the Fourth Amendment—is a federally
protected interest. Therefore, the question of judicial power to grant
Bivens damages is not a problem of the “source” of the “right”;
instead, the question is whether the power to authorize damages as a
judicial remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional right is
placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in Congress’ hands.160

To answer this question, Justice Harlan initially noted that
it would be at least anomalous to conclude that the federal judiciary—
while competent to choose among the range of traditional judicial
remedies to implement statutory and common-law policies . . . —is
powerless to accord a damages remedy to vindicate social policies
which, by virtue of their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed
predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of the
popular will.161

He then moved to the power of the federal courts, conceded because
of Young, to enjoin constitutional violations, observing that this power
does not depend on congressional authorization.162 Although Harlan was
careful here to caution that the availability of such injunctive relief was
not a matter of right but depends on an “exercise of equitable remedial

160. Id. at 399–402 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 403–04.
162. Id. at 404.
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discretion,”163 he also emphasized that the availability of “equitable relief
against threatened invasions of constitutional interests appears entirely to
negate the contention that the status of an interest as constitutionally
protected divests federal courts of the power to grant damages absent
express congressional authorization.”164 Again, it is the general remedial
power of the federal courts when constitutional rights are at stake, not a
special exception for injunctions, that warrants judicial protection for
Bivens.
Equally as important, Justice Harlan then concluded by strongly
implying that the absence of any judicial remedy for the violation of
Bivens’ Fourth Amendment rights would be constitutionally intolerable:
Putting aside the desirability of leaving the problem of federal official
liability to the vagaries of common-law actions, it is apparent that
some form of damages is the only possible remedy for someone in
Bivens’ alleged position. It will be a rare case indeed in which an
individual in Bivens’ position will be able to obviate the harm by
securing injunctive relief from any court. However desirable a direct
remedy against the Government might be as a substitute for individual
official liability, the sovereign still remains immune to suit. Finally,
assuming Bivens’ innocence of the crime charged, the “exclusionary
rule” is simply irrelevant. For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages
or nothing.165

If this description of Bivens’ situation carries its intended rhetorical
weight, it is because “nothing” is an unacceptable judicial response to a
violation of constitutional rights. For injuries that are purely statutory,
“nothing” might well be the judicial response Bivens would receive, and
without controversy, if Congress had displaced the judicial authority
Justice Harlan defends. Justice Harlan’s justification for the Bivens
remedy is thus ultimately convincing because the injuries Bivens suffered
at the hands of the federal narcotics agents were prohibited by the
Constitution, and thus demanded a remedy even in the face of
congressional silence.
Subsequent decisions applying the Bivens right to sue initially sought
to spell out its relationship to federal statutory remedies. The relationship
was, of course, anticipated in some depth by Justice Brennan’s Bivens
opinion. Far from denying the force of Justice Black’s defense of
Congress’s primary role in designing remedial schemes to address
constitutional violations, Brennan explicitly welcomed “affirmative
action by Congress.” 166 Furthermore, the free-standing constitutional

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 405.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 409–10.
Id. at 396.
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remedy Bivens authorized could be expected to recede if and when
Congress did act. Thus, Justice Brennan emphasized, “we have here no
explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal
officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money
damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy,
equally effective in the view of Congress.”167
The judicial power asserted in Bivens is thus far from a claim to
exclusive authority over judicial remedies for constitutional violations by
federal officers. It is instead designed to be reciprocal and often
interstitial. Because they would have the greatest impact when there were
no statutory remedies, the prospect of Bivens suits might be expected to
serve as a prod to Congress to enact analogs to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress
constitutional violations by federal officers. This posture of anticipatory
deference may reflect a wise recognition both of the influence the structure
of the Constitution gives to Congress over the exercise of federal judicial
power, 168 and of the presumed greater political legitimacy of
constitutional remedies when they are fashioned by a more directly
accountable branch of government.
At first, the Court’s applications of Bivens largely reflected Justice
Brennan’s dialogic outlook. In both Davis v. Passman and Carlson v.
Green, the Court authorized damage remedies for violations of the Equal
Protection guarantee embedded in the Fifth Amendment and of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
respectively. 169 Both decisions were arrived at only after a thorough
examination of the availability (or not) and effectiveness of federal
statutory remedies.170 Carlson in particular, no doubt the high-water mark
for the Bivens remedy in the Supreme Court, contained a detailed
explanation by Justice Brennan of what he took to be a constitutionally
sufficient remedial regime, leading to reasonable expectations that such a
regime would be required by Bivens.171
Since Carlson, though, decided more than four decades ago, the
Supreme Court has disallowed Bivens damage remedies in every case it
has taken up.172 In recent years, the Court has referred to every proposed
167. Id. at 397.
168. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The lower courts’ existence is up to Congress, as is
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
169. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24–
25 (1980).
170. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 241–42; Green, 446 U.S. at 18–19.
171. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21–23.
172. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (refusing to allow a Bivens claim for a
federal employee fired in violation of First Amendment when adequate civil service remedies
were available); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428–29 (1988) (denying Bivens remedy
to Social Security disability recipients deprived of benefits without due process even though
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application of Bivens as “new,” and has made clear that it views the Bivens
remedy as one it is free to allow or disregard as it sees fit.173 At least three
Justices have expressed regret that the Court ever recognized the Bivens
right to sue at all,174 and have urged that its application be limited to cases
involving facts precisely identical to those presented by Davis, Carlson,
and Bivens itself.175
For a while, the Court’s opinions declining to permit Bivens damage
remedies remained attentive to Justice Brennan’s concern for the
sufficiency of alternative forms of relief for unconstitutional injuries
provided by federal statutes. But in Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court
denied Bivens damages to plaintiffs who had suffered unconstitutionally
inflicted injuries that were admittedly left without any remedy.176 And, in
United States v. Stanley, the Court held that neither Bivens nor any other
remedies were available to military service personnel victimized by
unconstitutional medical experimentation by their superior officers. 177
The rationale for this outcome was that only Congress could authorize
relief for unconstitutional harms inflicted on enlisted military
personnel.178
Since Stanley, the Court has made clear that any remedial scheme
provided by Congress will supplant Bivens, without regard to its adequacy
in redressing unconstitutional injuries.179 The Court has also held that
even if Congress provides no statutory remedy for an unconstitutionally
inflicted injury, any request for a Bivens damage remedy is to be granted
only after undertaking “the kind of remedial determination that is
appropriate for a common-law tribunal.”180 When striking the appropriate
remedial balance, the Court has further admonished the district courts to
make sure “that a general Bivens cure would [not] be worse than the

some of their injuries were left unremedied); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 685–86
(1987) (denying Bivens remedy to enlisted army officer for harms suffered from
unconstitutional administration of LSD by his superiors); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537
(2007) (holding that Bivens remedies are both discretionary and not available if there is an
alternative process for protecting the constitutional right at stake); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843 (2017) (holding Bivens inapplicable to challenges to government policy decisions);
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (denying Bivens remedy to Mexican national shot
and killed across the border by U.S. immigration agents).
173. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550; Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2006–07.
174 . See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring);
Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2008 (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., concurring).
175. See Wilkie 551 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring); Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2008
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
176. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 427–29.
177. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 686.
178. Id. at 679–84.
179. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 537–38.
180. Id. at 538, 550 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
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disease” of unconstitutional injuries,181 and to pay “particular heed . . . to
any special factors counseling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of
federal litigation.” 182 This last limitation, “special factors counseling
hesitation,” is drawn directly from Bivens itself. 183 Justice Brennan
coined the phrase there to distinguish damage claims brought by the
United States as a plaintiff to recover for injuries suffered by one of its
soldiers, and suits seeking damages against a federal employee for actions
that though unauthorized, were not contrary to any constitutional
prohibition.184 Each of these situations, of course, already fell well outside
the ambit of the right to sue recognized in Bivens.
The Supreme Court’s most recent rejections of Bivens have invoked
the “special factors counseling hesitation” caution, despite its innocuous
origin, to preclude damage actions seeking to challenge harms caused by
unconstitutional federal policies, 185 apparently restricting the remedy’s
availability to the unconstitutional excesses of rogue federal actors. Even
further, any suits presenting a significant risk of “disruptive intrusion by
the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches,” also presents
“special factors,” apparently ruling out Bivens claims in contexts
involving national security or international relations.186 In the most recent
of these cases, Hernandez v. Mesa, decided in 2020, Justice Alito’s
opinion for the Court expressed deep skepticism about Bivens’s
legitimacy: “With the demise of federal general common law, a federal
court’s authority to recognize a damages remedy must rest at bottom on a
statute enacted by Congress . . . and no statute expressly creates a Bivens
remedy.”187
It is plain that the place of the Bivens remedy in our law has fallen
considerably over the five decades since Justice Harlan could observe that
for the violation of Bivens’s constitutional rights, “it is damages or
nothing,” with justifiable confidence that his audience would deem
“nothing” an unacceptable answer. Still, Bivens’s premise, that the
Constitution itself requires relief for its own violation, may not be entirely
dead, even in the Supreme Court. In Ziglar v. Abbasi—the 2017 decision
ruling out Bivens remedies for challenges to federal policies—Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court emphasized that even though they can
recover no damages, the injured plaintiffs had been entitled to seek
injunctive relief for unconstitutional injuries, as authorized by Young.188
181. Id. at 561.
182. Id. at 538, 550 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 378).
183. Id. at 550 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 378); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
184. Id. at 396–97.
185. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1848–50 (2017).
186. Id. at 1849.
187. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020).
188. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63.
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Kennedy gave no sign of awareness of the irony of reinforcing the ideas
that spawned Bivens in an opinion that helped to bury it. It is nevertheless
hard to understand why he would trouble to offer this reassurance if it
were not an important, even essential, element of the Constitution’s status
as our supreme law that injuries suffered in violation of it warrant an
adequate remedy.
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF A CLEAR AND CERTAIN REMEDY FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IN STATE COURTS
The federal courts have probably always been seen as more
hospitable to suits seeking relief from unconstitutional injuries than their
state counterparts. As far back as Chisholm v. Georgia, plaintiffs have
often sought a federal rather than state forum to contest the actions of a
state government, if only to avoid having their fate determined by another
branch of the same sovereign they are challenging.189 And it is anything
but clear whether state courts have either the legal or practical capacity to
adjudicate claims against federal officers.190 Over the century following
the Civil War, the advent of general “arising under” jurisdiction, the
development of the Young and Bivens right to sue, and the reinvigoration
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and with it, its jurisdictional companion, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343, 191 enabled the federal courts to exercise constitutional judicial
review reasonably effectively.
Still, as we have seen, these sources of law have not provided a
complete or entirely coherent remedial regime for constitutional
violations. For the Young and Bivens remedies, at least, the gaps may be
owing in part to an insufficiently clear conceptual foundation. In addition,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to preclude,
in the absence of a clear congressional override for purposes of enforcing
the post-Civil War Amendments, the exercise of federal court jurisdiction
over suits against states. 192 This restriction effectively bars monetary
relief against state governments, even if the result is that the federal courts

189. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI, as recognized in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97–98 (1984).
190. See generally In re Tarble, 80 U.S. 397 (1871). Since Tarble, injunctive relief
against federal officers has conventionally been seen as beyond the power of the state courts.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043,
1084–85 (2010). But see Richard S. Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal
Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385 (1964) (arguing that state courts are indeed equipped to grant and
enforce relief against federal officers).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (authorizing federal district court jurisdiction over suits seeking
damages or other relief under any act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights).
192. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890); see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976).
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are disabled from providing any remedy for an unconstitutional injury.193
The state courts, even if historically seen as less reliable forums for
the vindication of constitutional rights, 194 nevertheless occupied a
prominent place in the Constitution’s original design of judicial remedies.
Recall that under the Madisonian Compromise, the lower federal courts
owe their existence and power to exercise jurisdiction to Congress. 195
Equally important, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is addressed
explicitly to the state courts.196 It is fair to say that the 1787 Constitution
envisioned that the state courts would be the primary, and perhaps the
exclusive sources, of judicial remedies for violations of federal law, at
least at the level of original jurisdiction. So, it is fair to ask what
obligations, if any, this initially central constitutional role now requires
them to meet.
The Supreme Court has considered these obligations mainly in the
course of exercising appellate review of the disposition of questions of
federal law by the states’ highest courts.197 In this capacity, the court has
made clear that in cases within their general jurisdiction, the Supremacy
Clause requires the state courts at least to rely on federal law as a “rule of
decision,” setting aside any conflicting sources that state law might
suggest. 198 State courts must thus, unless precluded by Congress,
entertain claims for relief authorized by federal statutes—e.g., those
authorized by § 1983 199 —must reject any state law defenses to those

193. See Hans, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (stating the premise that state courts are also unavailable
in these circumstances). However, this Article challenges that aspect of Hans.
194. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105–06 (1977)
(arguing that federal courts are far better able than state courts to adjudicate constitutional
claims).
195. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that “the judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Congress did not confer
general federal question jurisdiction on the lower federal courts until 1875. Act of March 3,
1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)).
196. U.S. CONST art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
197. See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994); Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356
(1990); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus. Regul., 496
U.S. 18 (1990); Gen. Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
198. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 734–36; Howlett, 496 U.S. at 357; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386, 389–93 (1947).
199. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 357.
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claims, 200 and may not enforce jurisdictional or other court access
restrictions that treat federal claims less favorably than state law claims or
otherwise discriminate against them.201
State courts also have obligations with respect to suits presenting
constitutional claims without the support of a federal authorizing statute.
These suits often proceed in the state courts because they seek monetary
relief from state governments, the remedy that federal courts are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment from providing.202 The most instructive of these
cases is probably McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco.203 On the merits, McKesson was a challenge to a Florida tax on
wine and spirits on the grounds that it discriminated against out of state
distributors in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.204 The Florida
Supreme Court approved a prospective injunction against the differential
treatment but denied the plaintiff’s demand for a refund of excess taxes it
had already paid.205
On review, the Court first held that the Eleventh Amendment did not
preclude it from considering McKesson’s appeal because a case
commenced against a state in the state’s own courts did not implicate the
sovereign immunity protected by that Amendment’s withdrawal of federal
court jurisdiction over suits against state governments. 206 Justice
Brennan’s opinion for the Court then found that the Florida courts failed
to meet their obligations to McKesson under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 207 Due Process, Justice Brennan held,
requires state courts to afford an injured party “a clear and certain remedy”
for harm caused by a state government in violation of the Constitution.208
With respect to the discriminatory tax imposed by Florida, this obligation
demanded that the state either collect back taxes equivalent to those paid
by McKesson from in-state liquor distributors or refund the excess amount

200. See id.; Haywood, 556 U.S. at 734–36; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 784–85
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing discrimination against
federal claims in state court).
201. See, e.g., Howlett, 496 U.S. 356 (holding that a state court’s refusal to hear a
category of § 1983 claims when it entertained analogous state law claims violates the
Supremacy Clause); Haywood, 556 U.S. at 739 (holding that a state statute precluding state
court jurisdiction over a category of § 1983 claims violated the Supremacy Clause when it
operates as a device to undermine federal law); Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R.
Co., 279 U.S. 377, 386–87 (1929) (affirming authority of state courts to decline to decide federal
claims under the authority of a state venue statute that applied to both state and federal claims).
202. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 26–27.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 22–23.
205. Id. at 22.
206. Id. at 26–27.
207. Id. at 51.
208. Id. (quoting Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. O’Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 285 (1912)).
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unlawfully collected from McKesson. 209 The latter option, of course,
imposed a duty on Florida which would have been beyond the power of
the federal courts to impose without the state’s consent.
The McKesson opinion’s demand that state courts provide a “clear
and certain remedy” for constitutional violations by their own state
governments echoes Justice Brennan’s analogous concern in Bivens that
the federal courts stand ready to redress unconstitutional injuries by
federal officers.210 The McKesson requirement, however, does not appear
to share the qualifications that have come to blunt Bivens’s force. There
are no “special factors counseling hesitation” in McKesson, nor any
concern for “another remedy, equally effective in the view of
Congress.”211
We have seen the Supreme Court invoke these limits again and again
since 1980 to justify denying the Bivens damage remedy, emphasizing
both that it views the remedy as discretionary, and thus optional, and that
it is supplanted altogether by any statutory remedy for the relevant
constitutional violation, even if that remedy is concededly inadequate.212
The McKesson obligation, on the other hand, plainly applies even when
Congress has provided a remedial scheme for constitutional violations
under the color of state and local law that is generally seen as excellent
overall, even if it is incomplete. That remedial scheme is, of course, the
one provided by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, which authorizes every
form of relief in the judicial arsenal save for one—damages payable by a
state government.213
On the same day that the Court handed down its McKesson decision,
it also decided Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, a case that clarified the
obligation of state courts to entertain § 1983 claims and to disregard
sovereign immunity defenses to damage relief asserted by local
government defendants.214 Section 1983 was, of course, also available to
the McKesson plaintiffs, and would have authorized the injunction they
secured, though obviously not the damage award ultimately authorized by
the Court under the direct authority of the Constitution itself. Justice
Brennan’s opinion in McKesson did not so much as mention Howlett,
which he also authored. For the Court that decided Howlett and
209. Id. at 40–41.
210. See supra notes 171–86 and accompanying text.
211. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396–97 (1971). See generally McKesson, 496 U.S. 18.
212. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561–62 (2007).
213. Section 1983 allows people to sue the government when civil rights protected by the
Constitution and federal statutes are violated by someone acting under the color of state or local
law. Section 1988 authorizes federal courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing
parties in civil rights litigation.
214. Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990). It is notable that both
Howlett and McKesson were decided at the same time.
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McKesson, then, the constitutional duties of the state courts seemingly are
both impervious to parallel remedies provided by Congress and require
that an adequate remedy be afforded against every defendant responsible
for an unconstitutional injury.215
This independence of the constitutional responsibilities of the state
courts from congressional influence also stands in sharp contrast to the
diminished availability of federal court injunctive relief under Young if
remedies are authorized by federal statutes. As we have seen, the Supreme
Court’s Armstrong decision makes clear that the Young remedy may be
eliminated or supplanted by Congress with respect to rights guaranteed by
federal statutes.216 This outcome had been foreshadowed nineteen years
earlier by another decision limiting Young: Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida. 217 In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Congress could not
deploy its Article I legislative powers to override the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.218 But the Court further
held that Congress’s impermissible effort to authorize suits against states
effectively displaced Young injunction suits against state officers seeking
to enforce Article I statutory rights.219 Armstrong and Seminole Tribe thus
together underscore Congress’s plenary control over whether and which
judicial remedies are available for violations of federal statutory rights.
The Seminole Tribe opinion’s explanation of the role of the Young
remedy relied heavily on Schweiker v. Chilicky,220 a decision involving
constitutional rights drawn from the Court’s Bivens line of decisions.221
In that case, the Court disallowed a Bivens damage remedy on the ground
that a federal court’s authority to grant it had been supplanted by forms of
federal statutory relief that remedied some, but not all, of the injuries
inflicted by the federal officers whose unconstitutional conduct was at
issue.222
The Court’s reliance on Chilicky thus could be taken to suggest an
215. The Court held in McKesson that
if a state penalizes taxpayers for failure to remit their taxes in a timely fashion,
thus requiring them to pay first and obtain review later, the due process clause
requires that the state afford a meaningful post-payment remedy for taxes paid
pursuant to an unconstitutional tax scheme; . . . the remedy to a distributor for
having paid taxes higher than those paid by favored competitors would require a
refund of the excess tax or a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on the
favored competitors; and . . . there were no “equitable considerations” that would
justify refusal to award retroactive relief.
McKesson, 496 U.S. at 18.
216. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327–28 (2015).
217. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
218. Id. at 56–57.
219. Id. at 74–76.
220. Id. at 74.
221. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428–29 (1988).
222. Id.
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analogous congressional power to supplant Young in cases involving
constitutional rights as well.223 Obviously, because the injunctive relief
against state and local officers authorized by § 1983 is largely equivalent
to, and at least as effective as, a Young injunction,224 this concern is so far
mostly theoretical. But like the limitation on Bivens remedies, it
apparently does not affect McKesson’s guarantee of a “clear and certain
remedy” for constitutional violations in the state courts.225 Perhaps this is
because the textual directive to state courts from the Supremacy Clause
imposes remedial obligations to constitutional plaintiffs that are less
qualified than those owed by the federal courts, whose constitutional
responsibilities are more circumscribed by virtue of being shared with
Congress.
There is another sense, though, in which this “clear and certain”
constitutional remedy called for by McKesson may stand on weaker
ground than its Bivens and Young analogs. In McKesson, Florida offered
no sovereign immunity defense under either federal or state law.226 The
Florida courts therefore uncontestedly exercised jurisdiction over
McKesson’s suit. 227 Further, that suit was apparently authorized by a
Florida state statute permitting claims for refunds of allegedly unlawfully
collected tax payments.228 Hence, while the McKesson plaintiffs’ relief
was ultimately derived from the Constitution, their right to sue probably
was not.
We do not know, then, how the McKesson plaintiffs would have fared
if Florida had offered a robust sovereign immunity defense to
constitutional litigation against the state in its own courts. Such a defense
could take the form of a prohibition on state court jurisdiction over suits
against the state, a possibility to be considered directly in the next section
of this Article. It is also unclear how the plaintiffs would have fared if
Florida had not enacted the statute authorizing McKesson’s suit or had not
otherwise consented to or authorized any awards of monetary relief
against the state by any court. Would the McKesson plaintiffs
nevertheless have been able to proceed directly under the Constitution,
using the same kind of argument that best explains both Young and
223. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes injunctive relief against officers for constitutional
violations. The Supreme Court has interpreted that authorization to be coterminous with the
Young remedy. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). But see
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 340 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(discussing the differences between suits brought under § 1983 as a cause of action and
“equitable preemption actions” under Young).
224. The McKesson remedy against the State is not supplanted by a § 1983 remedy
against a state or local officer.
225. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus. Regul.,
496 U.S. 18, 19 (1990).
226. Id. at 49 n.34.
227. Id. at 26.
228. Id. at 24–25, 49 n.34.
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Bivens?
The Supreme Court decisions relating to a right to sue in state court
under the Constitution alone do not yield an entirely decisive resolution
of the question. They are, however, promising for constitutional plaintiffs.
The most prominent of these decisions is Reich v. Collins,229 decided four
years after McKesson. Reich also involved a state taxpayer’s effort to
recover discriminatory back taxes collected in violation of the
Constitution.230 The suit was filed in the Georgia state courts under the
authority of a state statute which provided that “[a] taxpayer shall be
refunded any and all taxes or fees which are determined to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed and collected from him under the laws of
this state, whether paid voluntarily or involuntarily.” 231 The Georgia
Supreme Court, however, held this statutory right to relief to be
unavailable to Reich because he had not pursued pre-deprivation remedies
also offered by Georgia law.232
Following McKesson, the Court’s opinion by Justice O’Connor first
observed that “‘a denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in
violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion
is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ . . . the sovereign
immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts
notwithstanding.” 233 Justice O’Connor next noted that the Eleventh
Amendment barred Reich from pursuing his constitutional right to a tax
refund in federal court.234
Applying these principles, Justice O’Connor then reiterated
McKesson’s holding that the state courts are obligated to provide “a clear
and certain remedy” for constitutional violations committed by their state
governments. 235 Although an entirely pre- or post-deprivation remedy
might satisfy this requirement, the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision to
nullify a statutory post-deprivation remedy mid-litigation did not. 236
Accordingly, Georgia was constitutionally obligated to grant Reich the tax
refund,237 a remedy that would have been closed off to him in federal court
by the Eleventh Amendment.238
The Supreme Court’s application of the “clear and certain remedy”
standard in Reich sheds light on some of the questions left open by
McKesson. First, Reich strongly suggests that a sovereign immunity
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994).
Id. at 108–09.
Id. at 109 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2-35(a)).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 109–10 (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369 (1930)).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 110–11.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 109–10.
Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375–77 (1990).
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defense on the merits is not available to a state government when a
plaintiff seeks relief from a constitutional violation in the state’s own
courts. Obviously, the assertion of such a defense under state law would
be barred by the Supremacy Clause if that plaintiff’s right to sue is
conferred by the Constitution. 239 More importantly, the sovereign
immunity of states—recognized by the Eleventh Amendment as a
constitutional bar against federal court jurisdiction over suits against
them—evidently does not protect state governments against relief sought
in their own courts in suits raising constitutional claims. 240 But since
Georgia did not invoke a sovereign immunity defense under either state
or federal law, the Court’s failure to recognize its availability in Reich may
not by itself be completely dispositive on this latter point. Nor, since the
Georgia courts adjudicated the case under authority of their general
jurisdiction, is the Supreme Court’s Reich opinion directly instructive on
the question of whether a state may constitutionally withdraw such
jurisdiction over cases seeking the “clear and certain remedy” required for
constitutional violations.
It is, however, difficult to escape the Reich opinion’s necessary
reliance on the Constitution itself as the source of the plaintiff’s claim.
The unconstitutionality of Georgia’s treatment of taxpayer Reich lay
precisely in its withdrawal of a statutory right to sue to recover state taxes,
themselves unconstitutionally levied.241 But if the right to sue under state
law had been withdrawn, what source of law did authorize Reich’s
challenge to that withdrawal? Though the Reich opinion does not
explicitly say so, an infinite regression can be avoided only if Reich’s right
to sue was based on the Constitution itself.
This view of Reich is underscored by the Court’s decision in Alden v.
Maine, which recognized the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity as
extending to suits in their own courts seeking to enforce federal statutory
rights. 242 Alden concerned a state employee’s claim for back wages
withheld in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.243 As a
consequence of the Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe, which, as we have
seen, interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to be incapable of override by
the exercise of Congress’s Article I legislative powers, the employee’s suit
could not have been adjudicated by a federal court.244 In Alden, the court
held that the immunity enjoyed by states from federal court suits to
enforce Article I statutory rights also barred such suits in the states’ own
courts. 245 This conclusion made clear that the sovereign immunity
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Reich, 513 U.S. at 110; Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367.
Reich, 513 U.S. at 109–10.
Id. at 108–10.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 742–43 (1999).
Id. at 711–12.
Id.
Id.
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recognized by the Eleventh Amendment was not just a jurisdictional
limitation on the exercise of federal judicial power. It also afforded the
states a substantive federal defense, grounded in the Alden majority’s
understanding of the original Constitution, to any judicial relief in suits
authorized by Congress’s exercise of its Article I powers.246
But did this substantive defense also apply to constitutional claims
made against the states under the authority of McKesson’s and Reich’s
“clear and certain remedy” requirement? The answer, apparently, is no.
Although the Alden majority opinion by Justice Kennedy expressed the,
no doubt sincere, hope that the “good faith of the States . . . provides an
important assurance that the ‘Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land,’” 247 it also specifically recognized that Reich remains
available as a backstop should that good faith falter.248
After recognizing that the constitutional violation at issue in Reich
was Georgia’s holding out a post-deprivation remedy for
unconstitutionally collected taxes only then to declare that the remedy did
not in fact exist, Justice Kennedy reiterated that “due process requires the
state to provide the remedy it has promised.”249 He then emphasized that
this “obligation arises from the Constitution itself,” distinguishing Reich
from Alden on the ground that “Reich does not speak to the power of
Congress to subject States to suits in their own courts.”250
Justice Kennedy’s distinction of Reich from Alden is convincing only
if the state courts are obliged to adjudicate constitutional claims against
their respective states. After Alden, the constitutional plan apparently
assures state governments a substantive immunity from the imposition of
legal liability by Congress in all courts, state and federal alike, except, of
course, for purposes of enforcing rights secured by the post-Civil War
amendments. But that plan does not exempt the states from the duty they
assumed, by ratifying the Constitution, to provide a clear and certain
judicial remedy, in their own courts, for their violations of the rights that
the Constitution guarantees. Alden thus resolves any uncertainty
remaining after Reich about the limits—as well as the scope—of the
substantive immunity available to the states after ratification of the
Constitution. As emphasized in Young, the states cannot use the sovereign
immunity they enjoy to “preclude a resort to [their] courts . . . for the
purpose of testing [the Constitutional] validity” of their actions.251

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 748.
Id. at 755 (quoting U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2).
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 146 (1908).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESUMPTION OF JURISDICTION OVER
CASES RAISING CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The claims for relief from constitutional violations recognized by
Young and Bivens for the federal courts and by McKesson and Reich for
the state courts appear to be inescapably premised on the Constitution
itself as their source. Still, in our system, these claims, like all others, can
proceed only in courts authorized to assume jurisdiction over them. A
failure of jurisdiction was, of course, the reason why Marbury’s otherwise
valid effort to secure his judgeship ultimately foundered.252
The defining characteristic of our federal courts is that they exercise
only limited jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction may well be subject to
unfettered control by Congress.253 While the state courts, by contrast, are
originally courts of general jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is also
susceptible to subject matter limitations enacted by state legislatures.
Whether federal or state legislative limitations on their courts’ jurisdiction
over cases raising constitutional claims are themselves constitutionally
permissible is a question that is much debated and remains unsettled.254
But, like Young, Bivens, and McKesson/Reich, the Supreme Court’s
consideration of this question reflects an assumption that the justiciability
of these constitutional cases does not depend on a right to sue granted by
the common law or conferred by statute, but one drawn from the
Constitution itself.
A. The Lower Federal Courts
The conventional understanding of the subject matter jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts is that it is ultimately subject to plenary
congressional control, even in cases presenting constitutional claims.255
For example, in Sheldon v. Sill, the Court held that because the lower
federal courts owe their existence to Congress, they are permitted to
exercise only that portion of the subject matter jurisdiction authorized by
the Constitution which Congress has conferred on them. 256 Although
Sheldon was not itself a constitutional case,257 its holding has served as
the starting point for the Supreme Court’s later opinions in Johnson v.

252. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
253. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442–43 (1850); PETER LOW ET AL., FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL STATE RELATIONS, 515–17 (9th ed. 2018).
254. See LOW ET AL., supra note 253, at 499; Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 895, 897 n.9 (1984) (quoting a letter from friend and scholar William Van Alstyne, who
described the literature as “choking on redundancy”).
255. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 442–43; LOW ET AL., supra note 253, at 515–17.
256. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 442.
257. Id. at 448. Sheldon was really about collusion to create diversity jurisdiction in order
to get into federal court. Id. at 450.
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Robison,258 and then in Webster v. Doe.259
Both Johnson and Webster presented the question whether federal
statutes alleged by federal officer defendants to preclude lower court
jurisdiction over constitutional claims against them could constitutionally
be given effect. 260 In both cases, the Court avoided this question by
interpreting the relevant statutes not to withdraw the ordinary exercise of
“arising under” jurisdiction by the federal district courts.261 The reason
for the narrow interpretation was that any complete curtailment of the
exercise of federal judicial power to determine the constitutionality of the
actions of federal officers itself raised a “serious constitutional
question.”262 Thus, any statute purporting to accomplish such a complete
curtailment was required to use unmistakably clear language in order to
be construed to do so. The relevant statutes in Johnson and Webster did
not meet this clarity requirement and therefore did not succeed in
precluding the exercise of jurisdiction.263
The significant constitutional question avoided by this “clear
statement” requirement is whether Congress can “deny any judicial forum
for a colorable constitutional claim.”264 That question would not be a
serious one if the justiciability of a constitutional claim depended on a
common law or statutory right to sue, both already subject to Congress’s
plenary control in any event. Just as with rights established by federal
statutes, Congress could grant, preserve, or withhold rights of action to
enforce constitutional rights as it saw fit, confident that its exercise of
unfettered power would be sustained. In the absence of congressional
recognition of a right to sue, a district court exercising jurisdiction over a
case raising a constitutional claim would simply, and uncontroversially,
dismiss it on the ground that no relief could be granted. Only if the
Constitution itself provides a right to sue for its violation does an effort by
Congress to cut off that right present a meaningful threat to its supremacy
as law.
Thus, it is unsurprising that the Court’s opinion in both Johnson and
Webster viewed the rights to sue threatened in the two cases as themselves
arising from the Constitution. 265 In both cases, the plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief against allegedly unconstitutional actions by federal
officials.266 Both cases also proceeded without aid of a federal statutory
258. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
259. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
260. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 366–74; Webster, 486 U.S. at 601–05.
261. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 366; Webster, 486 U.S. at 599.
262. Webster, 486 U.S. at 603 (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476
U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)).
263. Id. at 601, 603; Johnson, 415 U.S. at 373–74.
264. Webster, 486 U.S. at 603.
265. Id. at 603–04; Johnson, 415 U.S. at 365–66.
266. Webster, 486 U.S. at 601–02; Johnson, 415 U.S. at 361.
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right to sue, presumably under the authority of an uncontroversial
application of Young. In Johnson, the plaintiff’s suit collided with an
explicit statutory preclusion of federal court jurisdiction.267 The statute’s
failure of clarity was an absence of specific language including
constitutional claims within the scope of the preclusion.268 If the Young
remedy itself could be eliminated by Congress, it is hard to imagine that
omission could be fatal to the application of the jurisdictional bar. Only
if Young has a constitutional basis does its withdrawal by way of a
jurisdictional restriction become problematic.
In Webster, the plaintiff’s claim ran up against a statutory restraint
that was, linguistically at least, quite different from the one at issue in
Johnson. Far from explicitly prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction over
the plaintiff’s claim, Congress had provided only that “[t]he Director of
Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of
any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such
termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.”269
This language is not only silent about federal court jurisdiction over suits
challenging the CIA Director’s unconstitutional exercise of his
employment termination power; it does not even address any aspect of the
judicial power, at least directly, at all. It is not obvious that the statute’s
grant of, apparently unlimited, discretion to the Director is designed to
operate as a jurisdictional bar, like the provision at issue in Johnson. It
could instead be intended to curtail the availability of Young injunctive
relief against the potentially unlawful exercise of that discretion.
Conceivably, the language does not limit judicial power at all, but merely
confirms the CIA Director’s authority over Agency employment matters,
subject to otherwise applicable legal restraints.
The last of these understandings of the statute at issue in Webster
obviously presents no threat to judicial review of the constitutionality of
the CIA Director’s employment decision. The second reading, remedial
rather than jurisdictional, would also have allowed the Court to avoid the
jurisdictional restriction conundrum, but at the price of forcing it to face
the question of whether Congress has plenary authority over rights to sue
to redress constitutional violations.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the court in Webster chose
neither of these exits, instead adopting the first, jurisdictional, reading of
the statute. 270 He then held that, so understood, the provision did
effectively bar all judicial review of statutory challenges to the Director’s
decisions. 271 Brought face to face with the “‘serious constitutional
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Johnson, 415 U.S. at 373–74.
Id.
Webster, 486 U.S. at 594 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(c)).
Id. at 601–02.
Id.
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question’ that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any
judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim,” Chief Justice
Rehnquist reiterated Johnson’s clear statement requirement and
concluded that Congress’s failure to satisfy it left the district court’s
constitutional jurisdiction intact.272 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s disposition
of Webster implies that the second possible reading of the statute, above,
is constitutionally impermissible.
The question of jurisdictional
preclusion can be a serious one only if Congress is not free to adopt the
sort of abridgment of Young suggested by that reading. The Court’s
Webster decision, like that in Johnson, depends on the proposition that the
Constitution requires access to an adequate judicial remedy for its
violation.
The Supreme Court’s most recent examination of congressional
power to curtail lower federal court jurisdiction in cases raising
constitutional claims occurred in the special context of the habeas corpus
clause. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court invalidated a federal statute
withdrawing jurisdiction from any “court, justice, or judge” to hear an
application for a writ of habeas corpus “filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination.” 273 This restraint on the exercise of
jurisdiction over habeas corpus applications in the federal district courts
was held unconstitutional because it amounted to an impermissible
suspension of “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,” in violation
of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, as applied to persons
held at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 274 The
Constitution authorizes suspension of habeas corpus, but only when “in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”275 These
conditions had concededly not been met with respect to the Guantanamo
detainees.
Boumediene was most significant for its holding that non-citizens
held in military custody outside the formally sovereign territory of the
United States were entitled to seek habeas corpus relief.276 But the Court’s
decision, like those in Johnson and Webster, also assumed that persons
harmed by constitutional violations enjoy a right to sue to redress the
violation.
Habeas corpus is different from other rights protected by the
Constitution because the privilege protected by the writ is itself a

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 603–04.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 736 (2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
Id. at 743.
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770; Fallon, supra note 190, at 1046–47.
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guarantee of access to judicial review. 277 For this reason, Congress’s
effort to deny jurisdiction to all courts over habeas corpus claims by
alleged enemy combatant detainees is itself a denial of a constitutionally
protected interest. By contrast, when Congress purports to withdraw
jurisdiction over suits seeking to vindicate other constitutional rights, such
as those protected by the Equal Protection Guarantee, as in Webster, or
the Free Exercise Clause, as in Johnson, it is not necessarily violating the
rights themselves. Instead, as the Court put it in Webster, it is merely
seeking to deny access to a judicial forum to protect them.278 Whether
such a denial is permissible is the serious constitutional question identified
by the Webster and Johnson opinions. But for habeas corpus, to deny
access to court is to deny the right itself.
Thus, the impact of Boumediene on the questions raised by other
congressional attempts to curtail jurisdiction over constitutional claims
may be limited. Still, the Boumediene opinion does shed some light onto
our question of whether the Constitution provides a right to sue for its
violation. Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has uninterruptedly
authorized the federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief to persons held
in custody under the authority of the federal government. 279 The
jurisdiction curtailment unsuccessfully attempted by Congress in
Boumediene is thus an example of a decision by Congress to preclude the
exercise of judicial review over a claim for relief that it had created. But
if federal habeas relief were within the exclusive domain of Congress,
Congress could accomplish a withdrawal of judicial review in a class (or
even all) habeas corpus cases (at least in federal court) by merely limiting
or repealing statutes authorizing the relief. No resort to a jurisdictional
bar would be necessary. But at the same time, a federal statute curtailing
the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts would be
unproblematic, since Congress would only be denying judicial power to
decide claims already subject to its plenary control.
The Boumediene opinion by Justice Kennedy did not see the
curtailment of habeas corpus jurisdiction this way. The opinion barely
mentioned the statutes authorizing habeas corpus relief in the federal
courts and nowhere suggested that a habeas applicant’s right to sue could
be argued to depend on them.280 Instead, its rationale rested entirely on
an understanding of the Suspension Clause of Article I as the source of
Boumediene would thus be
the right to seek that relief. 281
incomprehensible if a person’s right to bring a habeas corpus claim
277. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 737 (defining habeas corpus to be “a writ employed to
bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party’s imprisonment or
detention is not illegal” (citing Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
278. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 593 (1988).
279. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
280. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723–24.
281. Id. at 725.
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depended on a right of action granted by Congress.
Perhaps
unsurprisingly, given the unique character of the privilege, it is evident
that the Boumediene Court saw the judicial obligation to adjudicate habeas
corpus applications as deriving directly from the Constitution.
B. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court’s consideration of Congress’s control over its
own appellate jurisdiction over cases raising constitutional claims also
supports the understanding that the Constitution confers a right to sue for
relief from its violation. To be sure, a curtailment of appellate jurisdiction
is less problematic than the complete preclusions at issue in Johnson,
Webster, and Boumediene. If the Constitution provides a right to sue for
its violation, a successful denial by Congress of original jurisdiction to the
federal district courts necessarily interferes with the exercise of this right,
even if the suit may be pursued in state courts. But a right to sue need not
necessarily entail a right to appellate review, much less to Supreme Court
appellate review. A denial of such review thus may not raise the same
“serious constitutional question” at issue in Johnson and Webster.282 In
addition, Congress’s power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction is spelled out in the text of Article III,283 while its ability to
control the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts depends on a
structural argument derived from the Madisonian Compromise.284 The
Supreme Court may view its own interpretive power to be more
constrained by the first sort of limitation.
The Court famously reviewed a restriction on its appellate
jurisdiction in Ex parte McCardle,285 decided a century and a half ago.
McCardle, like Boumediene, was a habeas corpus case, resolved against
the applicant in the lower federal courts.286 Congress enacted a statute
withdrawing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over McCardle’s appeal as
the appeal was pending. 287 The Supreme Court nonetheless sustained
Congress’s power to terminate its jurisdiction, pointing to the plenary
control granted by Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.288
That clause authorizes the Supreme Court to exercise appellate
jurisdiction in all cases within the federal judicial power conferred by
Article III, “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.”289 This language marked the beginning and end of

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448–49 (1850).
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
Id. at 514.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 513.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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the Court’s examination of Congress’s jurisdiction repeal. The repeal was
effective, regardless of its purpose or impact: “We are not at liberty to
inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its
power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”290 Since
McCardle, the power of Congress to curtail the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction has conventionally been viewed as unlimited, even in cases
presenting constitutional claims.291
To the extent that Boumediene can fairly be read to express
skepticism about any effort by Congress to curtail federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction without satisfying the “invasion or rebellion” prerequisites of
the Suspension Clause, the decision may qualify McCardle’s
thoroughgoing deference to Congress, at least in habeas cases. On the
other hand, the combination of explicit textual grounding for Congress’s
power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and the less
drastic character of such a limitation may leave that authority untouched
by Boumediene’s protection of the original jurisdiction of the federal
district courts.
Boumediene may even cast doubt on the vitality of the conventional
understanding as it might apply, beyond habeas corpus cases, to
constitutional claims more generally. Professor Richard Fallon has
persuasively suggested that after Boumediene, the argument that the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction may be wholly closed to
constitutional claims is far less convincing than it may once have been.292
Professor Fallon’s argument may founder on the sui generis character of
habeas corpus claims. But if it does not, it may have been prefigured by
McCardle itself. As has often been noted, after deferring to Congress’s
plenary textual control over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction,
Chief Justice Chase’s opinion concluded by observing that Congress’s
repeal of the jurisdictional source McCardle relied on did not deny “the
whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus.”293 The
repeal left intact the “jurisdiction which was previously exercised” to
review habeas cases via writs of certiorari.294 Presumably, Chief Justice
Chase added this qualification because he suspected that a complete
foreclosure of Supreme Court review to a colorable constitutional claim
would raise a “serious constitutional question.”295 If that is so, it is, as
Johnson and Webster suggest, because the right to advance such a claim
is itself granted by the Constitution.

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514.
LOW ET AL., supra note 253, at 515–17.
Fallon, supra note 190, at 1093–94.
McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514.
Id.
See supra note 262–72 and accompanying text.
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C. The State Courts
In his famous dialogue article from 1953, Professor Henry Hart
suggested that a constitutional claimant denied access to federal court
jurisdiction could turn to the general jurisdiction of a state court for
relief.296 Under the Supremacy Clause, the state court would be obligated
to hear and decide the claim, even in the face of an effort by Congress,
such as that at issue in Boumediene to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction
by state and federal courts alike. 297 Hart’s argument appeals,
convincingly, to the proposition that the Constitution requires that some
court, somewhere, be available to remedy a plaintiff’s unconstitutionally
inflicted injuries.298
But what happens if the general jurisdiction Hart assumed would be
available in the courts of every state is curtailed by a state legislature rather
than by Congress? Suppose, for example, that the Georgia legislature
precluded all Georgia courts from exercising jurisdiction over Reich’s
claim against the state government. Do the obligations of the state courts
under the Supremacy Clause overcome a state’s power to deploy its
governmental resources, including judicial ones, as it sees fit? The
Supreme Court has been reluctant to provide a decisive answer to this
difficult constitutional question.299
The Court has held, in a line of decisions running from Testa v. Katt
through Howlett v. Rose to Haywood v. Drown, that the Supremacy Clause
requires state courts to adjudicate claims authorized by federal statutes
that fall within their general jurisdiction.300 In Haywood, the Court then
fell just short of holding that the Supremacy Clause further required that
state courts remain open to all federal statutory claims, even in the face of
a state statute barring their exercise of jurisdiction over such claims.301
Haywood concerned a New York statute that precluded its state courts
from adjudicating any claims for damages against corrections officers,
remitting claimants instead to a specialized forum that was authorized to
compensate them from state funds for harms unlawfully inflicted by the
officers. 302 The Court held that New York’s courts were nonetheless
required by the Supremacy Clause to adjudicate § 1983 claims against the
officers, finding the jurisdictional restraint unconstitutional on the ground
296. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363–64 (1953).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1401.
299. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 737–42 (2009) (discussing difficulty of the
question whether state courts are compelled by the Supremacy Clause to exercise jurisdiction
over all federal claims).
300. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–90 (1947); Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 367 (1990); Haywood, 556 U.S. at 756.
301. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 741–42.
302. Id. at 733–34.
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that it effectively treated these claims less favorably than those arising
under state law.303
Justice Stevens’s opinion adamantly insisted that it did not impose a
constitutional command that state courts assume jurisdiction over all
federal claims.304 It may be difficult, however, to conjure a jurisdictional
limitation that would satisfy his understanding of the non-discrimination
principle. After all, the restriction at issue in Haywood applied to all
damage suits against state correctional officers, not distinguishing state
from federal claims.305 Justice Thomas’s vehement dissent objected that
the Haywood majority did effectively impose such a jurisdictional
mandate on the states, a mandate which in his view improperly infringed
on their sovereign power to control their own governmental institutions,
including their courts,306 at least in the absence of a clear statement from
Congress.
Whatever the ultimate impact Haywood may have on state law limits
on state court jurisdiction over federal claims, it is clear that the decision
formally imposes obligations on the state courts only with respect to
claims, including those asserting constitutional rights, authorized by
federal statutes. The decision neither assumes nor depends on any view
of the question whether the Constitution confers a right to sue when those
rights are violated. But it is also clear that the justification for this
obligation is that the claims it applies to are federal, rather than that they
are statutory. If the Constitution were understood to entail a right to sue
for its violation, the Haywood Court’s rationale for requiring state courts
to exercise jurisdiction over § 1983 suits would also apply with at least
equal force to suits based only on that constitutional right.
Even Justice Thomas’s view that the exercise of jurisdiction by the
state courts as beyond Congress’s power to command would not rule out
such a command from the Constitution. Justice Thomas’s defense of state
court immunity from congressional control is analogous to the position
taken by the Supreme Court majority in Alden.307 Under both Alden and
Haywood, per Justice Thomas, the states are free to resist intrusions on
their sovereignty imposed by Congress’s imposition of federal statutory
obligations. In Alden, the tangible embodiment of state sovereignty was
the state treasury; in Haywood, it was the adjudicative resources of the
state courts.308 But in neither case does its sovereignty allow a state to
resist the obligations of the Constitution itself, obligations to which it
submitted by the act of ratification.

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 736–37.
Id. at 741–42.
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24 (McKinney 2011).
Haywood, 556 U.S. at 749–50 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 242–50 and accompanying text.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999); Haywood, 556 U.S. at 765.
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Haywood not only echoes the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in
Alden of rights to sue required by the Constitution; it also recalls the
Court’s disposition of a 1908 companion case to Young: General Oil v.
Crain.309 Crain involved an oil company’s state court challenge to an
inspection fee charged by the state of Tennessee.310 The suit alleged that
the fee violated the Dormant Commerce Clause and sought injunctive
relief against its enforcement. 311 As in Young, no federal statute
authorized the suit, though today it probably could have proceeded under
§ 1983.312
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that a state statute precluded the
state courts from exercising jurisdiction over the oil company’s suit.313
On review, the Supreme Court disregarded the state law jurisdictional bar
and reached the merits of the oil company’s constitutional claim, but then
decided that the inspection fee did not violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause.314
Justice Harlan, who also dissented in Young, would have dismissed
the oil company’s appeal on the ground that Tennessee had the right to
determine, exclusively under its own law, whether its courts could
entertain jurisdiction of the oil company’s suit.315 This right was part of
the state’s more general power “to say of what class of suits its own courts
may take cognizance.”316
The Crain majority disagreed, observing that
[i]f a suit . . . is precluded in the national courts by the [Eleventh]
Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a state to its
courts . . . without power of review by this court, it must be evident
that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many
provisions of the Constitution; and the [Fourteenth] Amendment,
which is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of its
operation.317

Crain no doubt provides significant support for the contention that
the state courts are obligated by the Supremacy Clause to exercise
jurisdiction over cases presenting constitutional claims. 318 But the
Haywood majority’s unwillingness to recognize such an unqualified
obligation for statutory claims shows that the jurisdictional duties imposed
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
Id. at 213–15.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 94–107.
Crain, 209 U.S. at 220–21.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 233–34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 233.
Id. at 226 (majority opinion).
See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text.
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by the Supremacy Clause on the state courts are far from settled.319 The
Crain opinion itself did not directly find the Tennessee jurisdictional
restraint to be unconstitutional, but rather decided only that its
enforcement by the Tennessee courts could not preclude Supreme Court
review of the merits of the oil company’s claim.320 This conclusion may
have been supplanted by the Supreme Court’s later development of “the
adequate and independent state ground” doctrine as a justification for
declining to review the merits of federal claims rejected by state courts on
state law grounds.321
But if it remains uncertain whether any state law jurisdictional
restriction can properly permit a state court to avoid adjudicating a case
raising a constitutional claim, Haywood and Crain make clear that, as with
similar restraints on the federal courts, such a restriction presents a
“serious constitutional question.”322 And, as Webster and Johnson show,
that question becomes serious only if the Constitution confers a right to
sue to persons injured by its violation.
VI. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF SEEING THE CONSTITUTION AS A
SWORD
This Article has argued that the coherence of significant elements of
our law of constitutional remedies depends on an understanding that the
Constitution itself grants persons injured by its violation a right to a
judicial remedy for their injury. It remains true, however, that the
Supreme Court has never directly endorsed such an understanding. Nor
is it even clear just what specific provisions of the Constitution might
support it. As we have seen, Haywood relies on the Supremacy Clause as
the source of a—formally, at least, conditional—duty of the state courts
to exercise jurisdiction over claims authorized by federal law. 323 The
decisions on the remedial duties of the state courts, McKesson and Reich,
interpret the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require
a “clear and certain” state court judicial remedy for constitutional
violations.324 If this interpretation is correct, the same protection provided
by the Fifth Amendment would presumably impose an analogous demand
on the federal courts. And yet, the foundational decisions on federal
judicial power, Young and Bivens, do not appear to rest on any particular
constitutional clause as the source of a right to sue. They instead point, in
319. See supra notes 303–05 and accompanying text.
320. Crain, 209 U.S. at 228.
321. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447–48 (1965); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1037–44 (1983). Both cases discuss and apply the “adequate and independent state
ground” doctrine.
322. See supra notes 257–71 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 299–306 and accompanying text.
324. See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus.
Regul., 496 U.S. 18, 19 (1990); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 106–07 (1994).
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Young, to “superior authority of [the] Constitution,”325 and in Bivens, to
“federally protected rights,” 326 Marbury’s “essence of civil liberty,” 327
and to the decision’s “vindication of a federal constitutional right.”328 The
basis for the Supreme Court’s presumption of jurisdiction for cases raising
constitutional claims is similarly general. It is designed simply to avoid
“the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal statute
were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional
claim.”329
To specify particular doctrinal consequences that might result from a
general acceptance of the proposition that the Constitution contains its
own right to sue is also an elusive task. Perhaps the most that can be
securely said is that the starting points for argument about our law of
constitutional remedies would be more firmly rooted in premises that
favor constitutional plaintiffs. The first, and most fundamental, of these
premises, is that the rule of law established by our Constitution includes a
right to “test the validity” of any government action plausibly challenged
by an injured plaintiff as unconstitutional.330 This right means, in turn,
that if the challenge is successful the court adjudicating it must assure the
plaintiff an appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation, and that
our federal system must offer a court of competent jurisdiction with the
power to fulfill these promises.
These premises are qualified, of course, by limitations established in
the Constitution itself. For example, some constitutional claims are not
justiciable because responsibility for their resolution is assigned by the
Constitution itself to Congress, the Executive Branch, or both.331 Second,
because Article I confers exclusive power over federal expenditures on
Congress, damage awards of federal, though not state, funds are
impermissible without authorization by a federal statute.332 And third, the
state sovereign immunity protected, or restored, by the Eleventh
Amendment precludes the lower federal, though not the state, courts from
adjudicating constitutional claims against states without authorization by
a federal statute enacted under the authority of Section 5 of the Fourteenth

325. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
326. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392 (1971).
327. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
328. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring).
329. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam.
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 (1986)).
330. Young, 209 U.S. at 174.
331. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
200–01 (1962).
332. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 703–04 (1949).
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Amendment.333 Within these limits, though, recognition of a right to sue
from the Constitution can be expected to change how we think about the
remedial obligations and jurisdiction guarantees owed by the federal and
state courts in constitutional cases.
A. The Federal Courts
Even if a plaintiff has a right to sue drawn directly from the
Constitution, the remedial responsibilities of the federal courts are shared
with Congress. The specific grants of power to Congress both in Article
III and to enforce the post-Civil War amendments might even mean, per
Justice Black’s dissent in Bivens, that Congress’s role in shaping judicial
remedies for constitutional violations is primary, with the federal courts
serving as guarantors of a basic standard of adequacy. Justice Brennan’s
opinion for the Court in Bivens envisioned something like this approach,
acknowledging that the officer damages remedy it authorized ought not to
be awarded if “another remedy, equally effective in the view of
Congress,”334 were made available. Justice Brennan recognized that there
can be many ways by which courts can protect constitutional rights and
that our constitutional structure encourages Congress to fashion what it
takes to be an optimal remedial scheme.335 Judicial deference to such a
scheme, when Congress does invest the political capital needed to design
it, offers that encouragement, with the Bivens damage remedy held in
reserve as a backstop against sometimes inevitable congressional
inattention. As Justice Harlan observed, for Bivens, it was “damages or
nothing.”336
The Court’s approach to the Bivens remedy in Bush v. Lucas, the first
in what has now become a long string of decisions denying it, illustrates
this approach.337 In Bush, a federal employee, relying on Bivens, sought
damages from a supervisor who had fired him, allegedly in violation of
the First Amendment. 338 In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court
rejected the claim, but emphasized what it saw as the adequacy of the
alternative civil service remedies Congress had designed. 339 These
remedies included back pay, restoration—with retroactive seniority—to
the position from which the employee had been unlawfully discharged,
and a comprehensive administrative process that offered substantial

333. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976).
334. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
337. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
338. Id. at 370.
339. Id. at 378.
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automatic discovery rights and an opportunity to appeal. 340 The
shortcomings of the civil service system—no jury trial, no punitive
damages, no compensation for emotional harms—did not require a Bivens
remedy as an alternative or supplement.341 Congress’s decision to provide
“an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with
careful attention to conflicting policy considerations,” 342 warranted
deference from the federal courts. Justice Stevens saw Congress as “in a
far better position than a court”343 to design remedies for the denial of
federal employees’ First Amendment rights, even if they “do not provide
complete relief,” so long as these remedies are “meaningful” and do not
allow the wrong to “go unredressed.” 344 The civil service remedies
afforded to Bush satisfied this standard because they were intended to put
him “in the same position he would have been in had the
unjustified . . . action not taken place.”345
This reciprocal relationship between judicially fashioned and
statutory remedies, with the former receding as the latter advances, and
vice versa, has, as we have seen, been abandoned, even forgotten, by the
Court over the nearly four decades since Bush.346 The requirement of an
adequate remedy for a constitutional violation that flows from a
recognition of the Constitution as a source of a right to sue might well
prompt its recall and revival.
The Young injunctive remedy against constitutional violations by
government officers also shares a reciprocal relationship with federal
statutory remedies. Because of the comprehensive remedial regime
provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Young remedy is mostly redundant with
respect to deprivations of constitutional violations by persons acting
“under color” of state law.347 But in cases where § 1983 may not authorize
a claim, including virtually all cases against federal officers, an
understanding of the Young remedy as deriving from a constitutional right
to relief from unconstitutional injury, rather than as merely an exercise of
equitable discretion, would allow it to serve as the same kind of default
guarantor of remedial adequacy that the Bush approach suggests for
Bivens.

340. Id. at 375–76.
341. Id. at 388–90.
342. Id. at 388.
343. Id. at 389.
344. Id. at 388.
345. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-1062 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2097).
346. See supra notes 176–88 and accompanying text; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional
Remedies as Constitutional Law, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1865 (2021) (describing the competing view
that judicial power to fashion remedies for constitutional violations is exclusive rather than
shared with Congress).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Similarly, in a case like Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson,348 the
Supreme Court’s focus would necessarily have been on its responsibility
to deploy the Young remedy to assure adequate and timely relief to the
Texas abortion providers against the harm to their rights under the
Supreme Court’s reproductive freedom decisions caused by the prospect
of private damage suits. The approach actually taken by the Jackson
majority, declaring that Young relief was a narrow, discretionary
exception to state sovereign immunity, available under the common law
only against state executive officers, would have been much more difficult
to sustain under an understanding of the Constitution itself as requiring an
adequate judicial remedy for its violation.349
Chief Justice Roberts’s invocation of Marbury v. Madison warned
against the dire consequences he saw in his colleagues’ refusal to enjoin
the Texas enforcement scheme at issue in Jackson:
[Texas law] has had the effect of denying the exercise of what we have
held is a right protected under the Federal Constitution.
[It] has employed an array of stratagems designed to shield its
unconstitutional law from judicial review. [Under Marbury v.
Madison], it is a basic principle that the Constitution is the
“fundamental and paramount law of the nation” and “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”
....
. . . “[If the states] may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts
of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those
judgments, the [C]onstitution itself becomes a solemn mockery.”350

To this, the Chief Justice might only have added Marbury’s further
admonition that
[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection.
....
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation

348. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
349. Id. at 534–35.
350. Id. at 543, 545 (Roberts, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809)).
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of a vested legal right.351

Judicial acceptance of a right to sue grounded in the Constitution
could also be expected to reduce reliance on prudential considerations to
justify withholding remedies for unconstitutionally inflicted injuries. If
the Constitution provides access to a judicial remedy for its violation it
may become more difficult for courts to deny such a remedy on grounds
that are not themselves based on the Constitution.
In its landmark one person, one vote decision, Baker v. Carr, the
Court famously held that the Guarantee Clause of Article IV of the
Constitution did not, by its text, commit the resolution of all Equal
Protection challenges to the composition of state legislative districts to
Congress. 352 But in rejecting the application of the political question
doctrine in Baker, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion listed a number of
prudential grounds, not drawn from the Constitution, that might justify
application of the doctrine to dismiss subsequent cases.353 These grounds
included
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving [a case]; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.354

These open-ended, nearly standardless, rationales for declining to
adjudicate were, even before their announcement in Baker, criticized as
an abdication of judicial responsibility. Professor Herbert Wechsler
argued that
the only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision
is that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue
to another agency of government than the courts. . . . [W]hat is
involved is in itself an act of constitutional interpretation, to be made
and judged by standards that should govern the interpretive process
generally. That, I submit, is [totally] different from a broad discretion
to abstain or intervene.355

Professor Wechsler’s criticism notwithstanding, the prudential

351. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
352. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 234 (1962).
353. Id. at 217.
354. Id.
355. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1959).
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political question doctrine has been regularly invoked by both the
Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals as the reason for denying
remedies that might otherwise have been available under the authority of
Young or Bivens. Most notably, the Supreme Court recently held that
federal courts could not enjoin unconstitutional, non-racial
gerrymandering, because it concluded that challenges to the construction
of legislative districts could not be resolved through the application of
judicially manageable standards. 356 And numerous circuit courts have
denied Bivens claims for allegedly unconstitutional detention and torture
of prisoners in American military custody, relying in part on the “lack of
respect,” “unquestioning adherence,” and “embarrassment” strands of the
prudential political question doctrine.357
If the Bivens and Young remedies are themselves purely creatures of
common law discretion, the deployment of discretionary grounds to
withhold them may not be particularly noteworthy. But if Young and
Bivens were themselves understood to derive from the Constitution,
constitutional plaintiffs might be expected to overcome the doctrine more
often. Judges would likely feel more compelled to explain why a remedy
called for by the Constitution could justifiably be withheld on nonconstitutional, purely prudential, grounds. At the least, a decision to
award such a remedy could not so easily be dismissed as “a relic of the
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create
causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence
of a . . . constitutional prohibition.” 358 Instead, more secure in the
legitimacy of its power, the Supreme Court might return to the project of
elaborating what a constitutionally sufficient remedial scheme requires,
an effort begun in Carlson and Bush, but abandoned ever since.359
B. The State Courts
At least since the 1992 decision in Howlett, it has been clear that the
Supremacy Clause requires state courts of general jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims authorized by federal law. 360 In Howlett, and in the
decisions which prefigured it, the federal claims at stake had all been
authorized by statutes.361 But if, as hypothesized here, the Constitution
were acknowledged to provide a basis for a claim for relief, the Howlett
mandate would logically encompass that claim as well. As a consequence,
the Supremacy Clause would be understood to require the state courts to
356. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–09 (2019).
357. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585
F.3d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 2009); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 198–99 (7th Cir. 2012).
358. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
359. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
361. See Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358 (1990); see also Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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provide the clear and certain remedy called for by McKesson, and
reaffirmed by Reich, for any constitutional violation established in a case
falling within their respective jurisdictions.
So far, this obligation may appear to be similar to the duty of a federal
court, implied from the readings of Young and Bivens just suggested, to
assure an adequate remedy to a constitutional plaintiff, whether that
remedy is drawn from a federal statute or from the court’s inherent power
to enforce the Constitution. But the two duties, though analogous, are not
exactly the same, because the state courts occupy a different position from
the lower federal courts in our constitutional scheme.
Recall that under the Madisonian Compromise, the lower federal
courts owe their existence and power to adjudicate federal claims to
Congress.362 That power was not comprehensively extended until 1875
with the first general conferral of original, “arising under federal law”
jurisdiction on the federal trial courts.363 Until then, if federal claims,
including constitutional claims, could be initiated anywhere, it was in the
state courts. Hence the Supremacy Clause’s instruction, addressed
explicitly and only to “the Judges in every State,” that they are bound by
the Constitution and laws of the United States,364 was from the beginning
indispensable to the rule of law under the Constitution.
By contrast, the constitutional duties of the lower federal courts are
more indirect, and, as we have seen, inevitably mediated by their structural
dependence on Congress. The responsibility to provide remedies for
violations of constitutional rights is, by design, shared by the two
branches. The state courts’ remedial responsibilities are both less
dependent on Congress and “uniquely” more directly specified by the
Constitution.
Thus, in both the Bivens and Young lines of decision, the Supreme
Court has sometimes appropriately deferred to statutory remedies for
constitutional violations. But the responsibilities of the state courts of
general jurisdiction in constitutional cases are not necessarily satisfied by
their implementation of even robust statutory remedies. Though they are,
of course, obligated to grant all required federal statutory relief, such relief
does not displace the state courts’ direct, unqualified duty under the
Supremacy Clause to provide any additional remedies that the
Constitution may demand.
The constitutional damages remedy against the state government
required by McKesson 365 illustrates this difference. The out-of-state
liquor distributors’ Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to Florida’s
differential tax rate could have proceeded in federal court under 42 U.S.C.
362.
363.
364.
365.

See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
See supra notes 201–15 and accompanying text.
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§ 1983. Section 1983 authorizes a range of remedies for unconstitutional
state laws and policies, including injunctive relief against their
enforcement, attorney fees through § 1988 payable from state treasuries,
and, subject to higher protective qualified immunity defenses, damages
against official state officers. 366 Section 1983 does not, however,
authorize damage remedies against the states themselves.367 Nor is it clear
whether Congress has the power to authorize such remedies, which the
Eleventh Amendment places beyond the jurisdictional power of the
federal courts. On the one hand, Congress can use Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to override the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity by enacting remedial measures designed to enforce Fourteenth
Amendment rights.368 And the Court held, in McKesson itself, that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause may require a damage
remedy against a state for a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.369
On the other hand, the substantive constitutional interests protected by the
Dormant Commerce Clause were established by the original 1787
Constitution, not the Fourteenth Amendment, and may therefore be
beyond the reach of Congress’s Section 5 override power.370
These limitations, actual and potential, would not affect the remedial
calculus of a federal court adjudicating McKesson’s challenge. The logic
of Bivens and Young, linked by their common application in Seminole
Tribe,371 would call on that court to look first to the statutory remedies
made available to the plaintiff by § 1983. Since those remedies, despite
being incomplete, are plainly adequate, that first look is also the last one.
No additional relief, drawn directly from the Constitution itself, need be
made available to McKesson by a federal court.
The constitutional responsibilities of the Florida state courts that
heard the actual McKesson challenge were more exacting. Section 1983
remedies are equally available to state court and federal court plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, these remedies do not, as the McKesson decision shows,
supplant those required by the Constitution and thus do not exhaust the
remedial inquiry required of state court judges. The “clear and certain”
remedy for constitutional violations sets an independent, sometimes more
demanding, standard than the mere constitutional adequacy required by
Bivens and Young.

366. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988.
367. See § 1983.
368. See 1983, 1988; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342–43 (1979); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1976).
369. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus. Regul.,
496 U.S. 18, 22 (1990).
370. Id. at 34–35.
371. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996); see also supra notes 217–
22 and accompanying text.
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C. The Allocation of Constitutional Jurisdiction
If the right to sue to remedy an unconstitutionally inflicted injury is
itself conferred by the Constitution, a court of competent jurisdiction must
be available to adjudicate such a suit. That court may not need to be a
federal court. The apparently optional character of “arising under”
jurisdiction authorized by Article III, reinforced by Congress’s failure to
implement it generally until 1875, and fully until 1980, 372 suggests
strongly that Congress may control its exercise by the lower federal courts,
even in constitutional cases.
Nor does a constitutional right of access to a court of competent
jurisdiction necessarily entail a right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
There are, of course, formidable arguments, dating back to Justice Story’s
opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, that the values of uniformity,
finality, and supremacy support the necessity of Supreme Court review to
resolve disputed questions of federal law.373 This view also draws support
from the McCardle opinion’s recognition that the ban on habeas corpus
jurisdiction sustained there did not close off all avenues to Supreme Court
appellate review.374 Still, the plenary language of Article III’s Exceptions
Clause,375 and the enduring force of McCardle’s unyielding reading of
that clause,376 continues to support the conventional understanding that
Congress may constitutionally restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction.
The power of these conventional concessions of congressional
control over the constitutional jurisdiction of the federal courts does not,
however, mean that the control is without limits. If a plaintiff claiming an
unconstitutional injury has a constitutional right to seek a judicial remedy,
then an attempt by Congress to entirely foreclose that plaintiff’s access to
a court of competent jurisdiction is itself a violation of the Constitution
and cannot be sustained. This means that a federal statute, such as the one
at issue in Boumediene, that purports to deny both federal and state courts
the power to adjudicate cases presenting constitutional claims, is beyond
Congress’s constitutional authority. 377 Congress’s control over the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear constitutional claims may be
plenary, but it is also necessarily only allocative. If the federal courts are
to be closed to constitutional claims, the rule of the Constitution as law
requires that the state courts remain open.

372. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94
Stat. 2369 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331) (removing amount in controversy
requirement from § 1331).
373. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816).
374. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–14 (1868).
375. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
376. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514.
377. See supra notes 274–75 and accompanying text.
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This proposition draws on and may augment, if slightly, the
understanding proposed by Henry Hart’s classic dialogue article.378 In the
dialogue, Hart posited that the state courts may be the ultimate guarantors
of our constitutional rights.379 Acceptance of the Constitution as a source
of a right to sue for its own violation would reinforce the implications of
Hart’s idea for how our courts ought to treat federal jurisdiction
curtailment statutes that violate the principle of allocation.
Thus, while Congress may plainly preempt the exercise of state court
jurisdiction over constitutional claims, it may do so only if the power of
the federal courts to adjudicate these claims is left undisturbed. A state
court could not give effect to a blanket ban on jurisdiction. Similarly,
while Congress may, and obviously has, made liberal use of its power to
authorize the removal of cases presenting federal claims from the state
courts to the lower federal courts, it cannot authorize removal of cases
raising constitutional claims only then to direct their dismissal from
federal court for lack of jurisdiction. And finally, while state courts may
not, under the doctrine in Tarble’s case, be permitted to supervise the
conduct of federal officers by granting injunctive, mandamus, or habeas
corpus relief against them,380 that limitation is dependent, as Tarble itself
suggests,381 on the availability of a federal court endowed with jurisdiction
to award these forms of relief. Indeed, Hart himself drew on Johnson v.
Eisentrager, a case sustaining Congress’s power to withdraw federal court
jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition by a German prisoner held
overseas in American military custody, as an example of the residual
jurisdictional power of the state courts.382
The Hart dialogue does not directly argue that the state courts are
invariably required by the Supremacy Clause to exercise jurisdiction over
cases raising constitutional claims. Professor Hart appeared to assume
that their general jurisdiction, conferred by state law, would always be
available, not envisioning that states might carve out exceptions for
particular kinds of cases. 383 The New York statute invalidated in
Haywood, however, provides an example of a state legislature’s
willingness to enact such an exception, with the effect, and perhaps the
aim, of seeking to preclude its courts from adjudicating particular classes
of federal claims.384 The Haywood decision, as we have seen, showed that
the Supreme Court is both skeptical as to whether this kind of exception
is consistent with the Supremacy Clause, but also reluctant to hold directly
378. See Hart, supra note 296.
379. Id. at 1401.
380. In re Tarble, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 403–05 (1871).
381. Id. at 400–01; Fallon, supra note 190, at 1084–85.
382. Fallon, supra note 190, at 1093–95; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
776–77 (1950).
383. Fallon, supra note 190, at 1047–48.
384. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 732–34 (2009).

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

512

6/13/22 10:07 AM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:451

that neutral state law limitations may never exclude federal claims from
the general jurisdiction of their courts.385
It is possible that the robust immunity of state governmental
institutions endorsed by the current Supreme Court 386 may provide a
measure of independence to the states from congressional impositions on
the jurisdiction of their courts. But if the Constitution itself is the source
of a claim for relief by persons harmed by its violation, that claim should
override an assertion of state court jurisdictional immunity. The state
courts might therefore be free, even after Haywood, to decline, under some
circumstances, to adjudicate claims of official misconduct brought to them
under the authority of § 1983. But if challenged directly under the
Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, which has bound the states since
ratification, should be understood to require their courts to be competent
to provide the “clear and certain remedy” for such misconduct required by
McKesson and Reich.387
The Supreme Court’s suggestion in Crain that the constitutional
jurisdiction of the state courts is mandatory would then be correct.388 That
mandatory jurisdiction could not be supplanted by state legislatures, but
only by Congress’s exercise of its power to preempt it by placing
exclusive jurisdiction over, some or all, constitutional claims in the federal
courts. If the Constitution confers a right to sue for its own violation,
some court, somewhere, must have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought
by that suit. That understanding, at any rate, would redeem the premise
of the story about our Constitution that we hope is told by Marbury v.
Madison.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution contains a
right to sue for its own violation. This Article has, however, claimed that
many of the Court’s decisions protecting constitutional rights may depend
on an assumption that it does. Were the Court squarely to recognize, and
validate, this assumption, the remedies available to constitutional
plaintiffs would become significantly more secure than they appear to be
now. But on the evidence of its decisions in Armstrong and, most recently
(and strikingly), in Jackson, the current Court seems to be moving rapidly
in the opposite direction. These decisions threaten the structure of
constitutional remedies by undermining one of its central premises: that
the rule of law in the United States guarantees anyone who is injured in
385. Id. at 735–36.
386. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 523 (2012); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178–79 (1992);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907–08 (1997).
387. See supra notes 201–41 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 309–21 and accompanying text.
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violation of the Constitution a right to a judicial remedy for that injury.
This premise, that the Constitution is indeed a sword, has shaped our
understanding of that rule of law since Marbury v. Madison. We can only
hope that Marbury’s constitutional narrative is not inexorably on the way
to becoming just another old story we share when we wax nostalgic about
how things used to be.

